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Neuro-Voir Dire and the Architecture of Bias
Dov Fox*
Courts and commentators routinely assume that “bias” on the jury encompasses any
source of influence upon jurors that does not come directly from the evidence presented
at trial. This sweeping conception of juror bias is flawed because it fails to distinguish the
prejudices and affinities that infect jury decisionmaking from the experiences and
perspectives that enrich it. This Article uses a thought experiment informed by the
neuroscience of bias to illuminate the complexity of juror influences that go by the name
of bias. I distinguish four distinct categories of juror influence: personal interests,
community interests, case-specific beliefs, and case-general beliefs. I apply this spectrum
of juror bias to provide a sounder way to think about what kind of juries we want.
I argue that trial courts should limit the interrogation and disqualification of prospective
jurors to personal interests in the case—whether social or financial—and to case-specific
beliefs arising from pretrial facts or rumors about the parties or events. By contrast, I
would permit no such wholesale exclusion, either for community interests, which range
from principles of justice to desires for vengeance, or for case-general beliefs about social
causes or groups, which span scruples to dogmatism, and empathy to bigotry. My
proposal to abolish challenges for these latter categories of outside influence raises the
serious concern that accommodating their presence on the jury risks facilitating unjust
outcomes, jury nullification, and hung juries. Trial courts should mitigate these risks by
adopting two bias-tempering measures. First, jury pools should be diversified in ways that
social cognition research suggests would attenuate the influence of unreflexive or
objectionable attitudes. Second, judges should instruct deliberating jurors to express,
along with their own position, the strongest counterarguments to it, so as to disrupt
exaggerated assumptions of division and facilitate openness to persuasion.

* Assistant Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law. I am grateful for
conversation and comments to Larry Alexander, Ron Allen, Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Kevin Cole, Don
Dripps, David Faigman, Scott Grinsell, Adam Hirsch, Paul Horton, Greg Klass, Adam Kolber, Emily
Murphy, Amanda Pustilnik, Natalie Ram, Richard Re, Nicole Ries Fox, Peter Schuck, Julie Seaman,
Mike Seidman, Francis Shen, Dan Simon, John Villasenor, Robin West, and the law faculty workshop
participants at Georgetown and San Diego. Special thanks for exceptional research assistance to the
reference librarians at the University of San Diego Legal Research Center and for helpful editorial
suggestions to Ben Buchwalter and the staff of the Hastings Law Journal.
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Introduction
Impartiality is not a technical conception. It is a state of mind.
—Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2917 (2010) (quoting
United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 145 (1936)).

The acquittal of George Zimmerman for the shooting death of
Trayvon Martin was more than a flashpoint for race relations in the
United States. It also illustrated an enduring puzzle about what makes
jury verdicts legitimate. Charges of bias were widespread after this “trial
of a neighborhood watchman for shooting an unarmed black kid,” before
1
“a jury with no black members.” Many critics seem ultimately to have
1. William Saletan, Jury Rigged: Did Racism Skew the Zimmerman Verdict?, Slate (July 17,
2013,
4:02 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/frame_game/2013/07/
zimmerman_jury_bias_did_racism_or_stand_your_ground_skew_the_verdict.html. As this Article
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accepted the jury’s decision, however, either because “justice is defined
2
by the verdict that follows a fair trial” or because, as President Obama
3
put it to the American public, “a jury has spoken.”
Why do we put such faith in the jury? The institutions whose
decisions the government affords the force of law are usually thought to
acquire their legitimacy from mechanisms designed to hold those
decisionmakers responsible. Accordingly, legislators are beholden to their
constituents; agency administrators answer to elected representatives; and
even unelected judges must articulate the reasons that support their
4
rulings. Within this system of democratic accountability, the institution of
5
the jury looks like an anomaly.
Juries render verdicts that determine liability, guilt, and even death.
Yet jurors are neither rewarded for sound verdicts nor penalized for
6
specious ones. Their deliberations are shrouded in secrecy and they
7
provide no justification for the decisions they reach. “[I]nformation
enters and legal conclusions are produced,” as one court explained, but
“[t]he methods and reasons for arriving at those conclusions are
8
unknown.” The black box that produces jury verdicts is often perceived
9
10
as “almost-mystical,” or “akin to a religious revelation.” Indeed, one of
the few points of convergence among commentators following the
11
Zimmerman trial is that “we look to jurors to be modern-day oracles.”

went to press, another predominantly white Florida jury, in a case similar to the Zimmerman trial,
declined to convict a white man, Michael Dunn, of first-degree murder after he fatally shot an
unarmed black teenager, Jordan Davis. See Timothy Williams, 3 Opposed First-Degree Murder
Conviction in Florida Trial, N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 2014, at A10.
2. Charles Krauthammer, The Zimmerman Case: A Touch of Sanity, Wash. Post (July 18, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/charles-krauthammer-the-zimmerman-case--a-touch-ofsanity/2013/07/18/35f30c00-efdd-11e2-a1f9-ea873b7e0424_story.html.
3. Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, Statement by the President
(July 14, 2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/07/14/statementpresident.
4. See, e.g., Dov Fox, Interest Creep, 83 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 237 (2014).
5. See, e.g., James Q. Whitman, The Origins of Reasonable Doubt: Theological Roots of
the Criminal Trial 12−13, 56 (2008).
6. That jurors are convened to decide a single case before being disbanded, Calabresi and
Bobbitt argue, equips them to disguise or diffuse the unpopular tradeoffs involved in “tragic choices”
that sacrifice one human life or sacred value for another. Guido Calabresi & Philip Bobbitt, Tragic
Choices 57−62 (1978). For discussion of jury trade-offs as between a suspect law and the rule of law
itself, see infra notes 233−237 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Note, Choosing Representatives by Lottery Voting, 93 Yale L.J.
1283, 1290 n.45 (1984) (calling “[u]naccountability . . . a hallmark of the American jury”).
8. Children Int’l v. Ammon Painting Co., 215 S.W.3d 194, 200 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006).
9. David Alan Sklansky, Evidentiary Instructions and the Jury as Other, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 407,
410 (2013).
10. Julie A. Seaman, Black Boxes, 58 Emory L.J. 427, 487 (2008).
11. Adam Cohen, The Lessons of George Zimmerman’s ‘Not Guilty’ Verdict, Time (July 14, 2013),
http://ideas.time.com/2013/07/14/the-lesson-of-george-zimmermans-not-guilty-verdict.
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In the absence of safeguards against arbitrary or unjust
decisionmaking, the jury’s legitimacy comes from the most salient
constitutional requirement of its composition: that jurors be
12
“impartial.” Jury doctrine says little, however, about what such
13
impartiality requires beyond that jurors be “free[] from any bias.”
The word “bias” appears nowhere in those clauses of the Sixth or
Seventh Amendments, which apply the jury impartiality mandate to
14
criminal and many civil trials. But the jurisprudence of jury impartiality
leans heavily on that concept. The Supreme Court has long emphasized
that the aim to “prevent[] bias . . . . lies at the very heart of the jury
15
system.” Courts have accordingly affirmed that the bias of “even a single
juror would violate [the] right to a fair trial” by “impartial, indifferent
16
jurors.”
We usually think of bias as a decidedly pejorative state of mind
marked by odious prejudices or unfounded stereotypes. The Supreme
Court, however, often talks about jury bias in more sweeping terms. The
Court has repeatedly affirmed that bias constitutes “any influence” that
jurors acquire outside of the “evidence and argument [presented] in open
17
court.” This blanket conception of jury bias as comprising “any outside
18
influence” runs deep in the law. As far back as the treason trial of
Aaron Burr, Chief Justice Marshall made clear that although “perhaps
impossible” to obtain such a jury in practice, it would be “extremely

12. U.S. Const. amend. VI. See Richard M. Re, Note, Re-Justifying the Fair Cross Section
Requirement: Equal Representation and Enfranchisement in the American Criminal Jury, 116 Yale L.J.
1568, 1580 (2007) (arguing that jurors who lack special incentives or qualifications “acquire the
information necessary to render legitimate verdicts after assuming their posts”).
13. Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887). For discussion of the indeterminacy of jury
impartiality in the doctrine, see Scott W. Howe, Juror Neutrality or an Impartiality Array? A Structural
Theory of The Impartial Jury Mandate, 70 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1173, 1176 (1995) (“The Court’s
opinions leave the concept of . . . impartiality murky.”); William S. Laufer, The Rhetoric of Innocence,
70 Wash. L. Rev. 329, 396 n.308 (1995) (“[C]ourts have been less than clear as to what is meant by the
construct of impartiality.”); Toni M. Massaro, Peremptories or Peers? Rethinking Sixth Amendment
Doctrine, Images, and Procedures, 64 N.C. L. Rev. 501, 529 (1986) (lamenting the doctrinal absence of
a “meaningful standard” of jury impartiality).
14. The Sixth Amendment guarantee of an “impartial jury” has been extended from federal to
state cases through the Fourteenth Amendment, Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 595 n.6 (1976), and
from criminal to civil cases under the Seventh. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 630
(1991) (“Civil juries, no less than their criminal counterparts, must . . . act as impartial factfinders.”).
My analysis applies to both criminal and civil juries, though their different sizes, voting rules, legal
questions, and standards of proof make some of the proposals described in Part III more important for
criminal than civil juries.
15. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 154 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting
Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
16. Dyer v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc).
17. Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2913 (2010) (quoting Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S.
454, 462 (1907) (emphasis added)).
18. Id. at 2948 (quoting Patterson, 205 U.S. at 462 (emphasis added)).
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desirable” for courts to empanel only those individuals who come to trial
19
altogether lacking in “any prepossessions whatever.”
A thought experiment can help test the desirability of that
aspiration to identify jurors who are thus unbiased in the sense that they
20
are “induced only by evidence and argument in open court.” Imagine a
machinesomething like a metal detector for your brainthat could
effectively scan potential jurors as they wait at the courthouse to reveal
the presence and magnitude of every such outside influence that much in
jury law refers to as bias. Call it “neuro-voir dire.” The phrase is Hank
Greely’s. He proposed some years ago that potential jurors might one
day be “put in a scanner and shown images relevant to a possible bias in
the case” while their “brains’ reactions” were examined for that bias as a
21
ground upon which to disqualify them from jury service. Would the
constitutional guarantee of an impartial jury permit or even require trial
courts to adopt this perfect technology of bias detection?
I suspect that many of us would recoil at the prospect of brain
scanning prospective jurors for signs of any outside influences in order to
exclude from the jury those who harbor such influences with sufficient
strength. Neuro-voir dire should give us pause, but not because it violates
juror privacy. The wholesale exclusion of bias is troubling because it fails
to recognize that outside mental influences are as diverse as the jurors
who harbor them and the conditions under which they arise.
Treating all such non-evidentiary influences in the same way misses
important normative and constitutional distinctions among them. Consider
four types of outside influences that are captured in the juror statements
reported in the following recent cases:
• “[W]hen Indians get alcohol, they all get drunk, and . . . when they
22
get drunk, they get violent.”
• “I overheard today—other jurors talking” about how the defendants
23
took out “an insurance policy that they could collect on” if convicted.
• “[I have had] good and bad experiences with [the] police . . . [in part]
24
because [I am] a Latino, [and] because [I have] an accent.’”
• “[I would want to] give that person a ‘lighter sentence’ [out of] . . . .
compassion, mercy . . . . as a really good person, who has suffered
25
[already].”

19. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49, 50−51 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692g).
20. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2913 (quoting Patterson, 205 U.S. at 462 (emphasis added)).
21. Henry T. Greely, Law and the Revolution in Neuroscience: An Early Look at the Field,
42 Akron L. Rev. 687, 697 (2009).
22. United States v. Benally, 546 F.3d 1230, 1231 (10th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1051
(2009) (internal quotations marks omitted).
23. Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2957−58 (2010) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
24. People v. Fowler, 845 N.Y.S.2d 599, 601 (2007).
25. State v. Stern, No. A–4744–10T1, 2013 WL 1798908, at *3 (N.J. Super. Ct., Apr. 30, 2013).
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The ethnic bigotry and backdoor rumors that are reflected in the
first two statements exemplify corrosive juror influences that can make a
trial categorically unfair. By contrast, the cultural perspectives and
convictions about justice in the last two statements typify the benign or
even constructive influences that inform a jury of peers and help it to
speak in the voice of the community. Yet these perspectives and
convictions are no less “outside” influences than are bigotry and rumors
that jury impartiality doctrine tends to lump under the catchall of bias.
Legal scholars have examined the implications of brain imaging for
26
27
two mental states that figure prominently in law: deception and pain.
But there has been no such neuroscientifically informed legal inquiry
28
into bias. This Article offers the first. It uses neuro-voir dire as a
motivating hypothetical or “intuition pump” that presses us to distinguish
29
pernicious juror influences from desirable ones.
This Article makes two contributions. First, it discredits the dominant
conception of juror bias that lacks the resources to distinguish good and
bad sources of juror influence. Second, it develops a novel spectrum of
cognitive bias with which to adjudicate complex questions of jury
impartiality in more principled and practical ways.
Part I traces our confusion about juror bias to two irreconcilable
ideals of the jury. The first expects jurors to maintain an objective point
of view, detached from the idiosyncrasies that threaten erratic or
specious decisionmaking. The second ideal insists that those subjective
experiences or attitudes are precisely what qualify jurors as laypersons
and peers to render a commonsense verdict that takes community norms
of fairness into account. It will not do simply to say that we must balance
these ideals of the jury by teasing the good kinds of bias apart from the
26. See, e.g., Amanda C. Pustilnik, Neurotechnologies at the Intersection of Criminal Procedure
and Constitutional Law, in The Constitution and the Future of the Criminal Law (John T. Parry &
L. Song Richardson eds., 2013); Nita A. Farahany, Incriminating Thoughts, 64 Stan. L. Rev. 351
(2012); Dov Fox, The Right to Silence as Protecting Mental Control, 42 Akron L. Rev. 763 (2009);
Henry T. Greely & Judy Illes, Neuroscience-Based Lie Detection: The Urgent Need for Regulation,
33 Am. J.L. & Med. 377 (2007); Michael S. Pardo, Neuroscience Evidence, Legal Culture, and Criminal
Procedure, 33 Am. J. Crim. L. 301 (2005); Julie Seaman, Black Boxes: fMRI Lie Detection and the Role
of the Jury, 42 Akron L. Rev. 931 (2009); Francis X. Shen, Neuroscience, Mental Privacy, and the Law,
36 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 653 (2013).
27. See, e.g., Adam J. Kolber, Pain Detection and the Privacy of Subjective Experience, 33 Am. J.L.
& Med. 433 (2007); Adam J. Kolber, The Experiential Future of the Law, 60 Emory L.J. 585 (2011);
Adam J. Kolber, The Subjective Experience of Punishment, 109 Colum. L. Rev. 182 (2009); Amanda
C. Pustilnik, Pain as Fact and Heuristic: How Pain Neuroimaging Illuminates Moral Dimensions of
Law, 97 Cornell L. Rev. 801 (2012).
28. The only sustained legal inquiry that I have seen consider the neuroscience of bias mentions
the jury just once in passing to suggest that “[t]he justice system might even go so far as to educate
juries, in appropriate cases, regarding the role that race can play in shaping and misshaping the
evidence presented to them.” Christian M. Halliburton, Race, Brain Science, and Critical DecisionMaking in the Context of Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 47 Gonz. L. Rev. 319, 339−40 (2011).
29. See, e.g., Daniel C. Dennett, Intuition Pumps and Other Tools for Thinking (2013).
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bad. The monolithic concept of bias that prevails in law and in science
deprives courts of a conceptual vocabulary with which to strike a
principled balance between the objective and subjective ideals of the jury.
Part II employs neuro-voir dire as a theoretical device to critically
examine that conception of bias that treats all outside influences as if
they were the same for purposes of achieving jury impartiality. It is easy
to suppose that concerns about cognitive privacy distinguish neuro-voir
dire from conventional juror questioning. But juror privacy interests are
declined the constitutional status that is afforded to the impartiality right
that voir dire is designed to vindicate.
The problem with neuro-voir dire is not that it would be a radical
departure from existing practices of jury selection. To the contrary, it is
similar in spirit to the methods of questioning jurors that we already
accept. This resemblance to traditional voir dire does not, however,
vindicate neurotechnological efforts to preserve “the purity of trial by
30
jury” by attempting to ensure “that every juror shall be free from bias,”
or at least “as nearly” free from “potential and latent bias . . . . as the lot
31
of humanity will admit.” Both high-tech and low-tech methods of bias
detection err to the extent that they collapse all possible sources of
outside juror influence under the same uniform conception of bias.
This Article develops a new way of thinking about juror bias. It
identifies four categories of outside influence: personal interests,
community interests, case-specific beliefs, and case-general beliefs. This
spectrum of cognitive biases helps to reconcile the objective and
subjective ideals of the jury in principled and practical ways. Courts
should restrict the interrogation and disqualification of jurors to two
categories of juror bias: personal interests in the case, whether social or
financial, and case-specific beliefs arising from pretrial facts or rumors
about the parties or events.
This proposal would permit neither interrogation nor
disqualification of jurors, by contrast, for community interests—which
may range from conceptions of justice to desire for vengeance—or casegeneral beliefs about social causes or groups—ranging from scruples to
dogmatism, from empathy to bigotry. This Article proposes two
mechanisms designed to temper objectionable kinds of outside influence.
The first is to diversify the jury pool by expanding the source lists of
those eligible to be called for service. The second is to require judges to
instruct jurors in ways that encourage them to admit ambivalence and
appreciate competing views.

30. Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 312 n.2 (1931) (quoting State v. McAfee, 64 N.C. 339,
340 (1870)).
31. State v. Lumumba, 601 A.2d 1178, 1187 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1992) (citation omitted).
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I. The Pictures in our Heads
Journalist Walter Lippmann explained in his 1922 book Public
Opinion that modern existence had become “altogether too big, too
complex, and too fleeting” for people to navigate contemporary society
without bringing to bear on their decisions a range of simplifying
32
“pictures” that “we carry about in our heads.” Lippmann explained that
“we have to reconstruct” the world around us “before we can manage
33
with it. To traverse the world men must have maps of the world.” It is
through these mental maps, he said, that “heroes are incarnated, devils
34
are made.”
Lippmann was referring specifically to group “stereotypes,” a term
35
that his book introduced to popular vernacular. His reflections about the
simplifying pictures in our heads, however, capture a much broader range
of cognitive, cultural, perceptual, and motivational influences on the way
36
that people, jurors included, process information and make decisions.
Of course, jurors do not reach verdicts as individuals in isolation.
Jurors’ biases are filtered through the process of group deliberations.
These deliberations might in particular cases reflect the sum of individual
biases, amplify certain among those biases through the process of
37
groupthink, or blunt other such biases in a manner depicted by the film
38
Twelve Angry Men. The Supreme Court has made clear that the
impartiality determinations about “[j]ury competence” are, as a
39
constitutional matter, “an individual rather than a group or class matter.”
So jury impartiality must, according to the doctrine, be evaluated as a
measure of individual bias.
A. Two Competing Ideals of the Jury
In the law and literature, we embrace two attractive yet incompatible
ideals of the jury. The first demands objective finders of fact in the search
for truth. This ideal directs trial courts to “aspire to” jurors who exhibit

32. Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion 16, 89 (1922).
33. Id. at 16.
34. Id. at 10.
35. Id. at 79.
36. See, e.g., Sara Gordon, Through the Eyes of Jurors: The Use of Schemas in the Application of
‘Plain-Language’ Jury Instructions, 64 Hastings L.J. 643, 663−65 (2013) (examining social science
findings that jurors’ preexisting attitudes about the law shape their use of jury instructions); Christine
Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 Calif. L. Rev. 969, 975 (2006) (arguing that
implicit race bias resembles other unconscious cognitive biases).
37. See generally Irving L. Janis, Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and
Fiascoes (1982) (examining psychological patterns of group dynamics).
38. 12 Angry Men (United Artists 1957).
39. Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946).
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40

“child-like innocence,” as Adrian Vermeule’s puts it, in the sense that
they are, in Lisa Kern Griffin’s words, “as free from cognitive bias as
41
possible.” Accordingly, any juror “preconceptions” that “derive from
an ‘extrajudicial source’” constitute “bias in the pejorative sense” that
42
“the law will find invidious.”
On this account, the blindfold worn by Lady Justice wards off the
distorting influence of any factors that might compromise jurors’
consideration of the testimony and evidence alone. Trial courts have
appealed to this concept when they instruct jurors, as Judge Garland E.
Burrell did last year in the Eastern District of California, to “take all of
the experiences that . . . have contributed to how you think about
everything” and “lay those experiences aside” as what “we call . . . your
43
biases.” Call this the objective ideal of the jury.
The second ideal insists that jurors’ subjective viewpoints equip them
44
to speak with “the voice of the community.” Unlike the single,
professional judge who decides a bench trial, “a jury, in exercising its
collective wisdom, is expected to bring its opinions, insights, common
45
sense, and everyday life experience into deliberations.” This rival ideal of
the jury regards Lady Justice’s blindfold not as enabling fair-minded
integrity, but as an imperiling parochialism in need of context and
46
perspective. Here, jurors are enriched by their particular convictions
47
and life circumstances. These kinds of influences do not, under this
48
alternative ideal of the jury, constitute “bias in need of silencing.”
49
The “deep-seated hunches . . . about social life” and other lessons
50
that “their human experience has taught them” instead equip jurors, as
Darryl Brown and Martha Minow have explained, to “empathize with

40. Adrian Vermeule, Contra Nemo Iudex in Sua Causa: The Limits of Impartiality, 122 Yale
L.J. 384, 403 (2012).
41. Lisa Kern Griffin, Narrative, Truth, and Trial, 101 Geo. L.J. 281, 315 (2013).
42. Vermeule, supra note 40, at 403.
43. Taylor v. Sisto, 606 F.3d 622, 623 (9th Cir. 2010), superseded by 449 F. App’x 665 (9th Cir. 2011).
44. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 600 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also
Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 461 (1984) (“Since the jury serves as the voice of the community, the
jury is in the best position to decide whether a particular crime is so heinous that the community’s
response must be death.”).
45. See State v. Briggs, 776 P.2d 1347, 1355 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989); see also Bibbins v. Dalsheim,
21 F.3d 13, 17 (2d Cir. 1994) (praising “the fund of ordinary experience that jurors may bring to the
jury room and may rely upon”).
46. See Judith Resnik & Dennis Curtis, Representing Justice: Invention, Controversy, and
Rights in City-States and Democratic Courtrooms 62 (2011).
47. Neil Vidmar & Valerie P. Hans, American Juries: The Verdict 66 (2007) (arguing that
juries, besides finding facts, are “also supposed to represent the various views of the community”).
48. Jeffrey Abramson, We, the Jury 195 (1994).
49. Darryl K. Brown, The Role of Race in Jury Impartiality and Venue Transfers, 53 Md. L. Rev.
107, 122 (1994).
50. Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 642 (1980) (citation ommited).
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others” and “know what is fair in this world, not in a laboratory.” Jurors’
preexisting values and idiosyncratic worldviews are on this conception
precisely what afford the jury its special “capacity,” as Justice Thurgood
Marshall has affirmed, “to render a commonsense, laymen’s judgment, as a
52
representative body drawn from the community.” This is the subjective
ideal of the jury.
Jury law clutches to both of these ideals in schizophrenic fashion.
For example, jurors in criminal and civil trials alike are instructed before
they deliberate to “decide the facts” based on nothing more than “the
evidence” and at the same time to rely on their “common sense[] and
53
experience.” After a verdict has been announced, Federal Rule of
Evidence 606(b) implicitly preserves space for the subjective ideal by
forbidding jurors from testifying “about any statement made or incident
54
that occurred during the jury’s deliberations.” Yet it also reinforces the
objective ideal by exempting post-verdict reports of any “outside
55
influence . . . brought to bear on any juror.”
Jury impartiality and equal protection jurisprudence likewise reflect
these irreconcilable ideals of the jury. The Supreme Court affirms a
56
subjective ideal of “diffused impartiality” when it requires measures
designed to help the jury exercise “the commonsense judgment of the
51. Martha Minow, Stripped Down Like a Runner or Enriched by Experience: Bias and
Impartiality of Judges and Jurors, 33 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1201, 1203 (1992).
52. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 402 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
53. See, e.g., State Bar of Ariz. Civil Jury Inst. Comm., Revised Arizona Jury Instructions
(Civil) Preliminary 1, Preliminary 5 (5th ed. 2013). See 27 Charles Alan Wright & Victor James
Gold, Federal Practice and Procedure § 6075 (2d ed. 2007). Jury nullification is another example.
The subjective ideal accounts in part for why we allow the jury in certain cases to refuse to enforce the
law when doing so conflicts with their best understandings of justice, while the objective ideal explains
why judges may not openly encourage such resistance to enact those outside perspectives. See United
States v. Navarro-Vargas, 408 F.3d 1184, 1199 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc).
54. Fed. R. Evid. 606(b).
55. Id.; see Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 127 (1987) (holding that voir dire and other trial
safeguards leave Rule 606(b)’s prohibition on inquiry into jury verdicts consistent with the Sixth
Amendment guarantee of an impartial jury). Circuit courts are split on how narrowly to interpret
Rule 606(b)’s bar on the admissibility of post-verdict juror testimony about misconduct during jury
deliberation. Compare United States v. Benally, 546 F.3d 1230, 1236−38 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding that
post-verdict juror testimony about behavior during deliberations may be admitted only if it falls within
Rule 606(b)’s manifest exceptions for “communicati[on] with third parties, bribes, and jury
tampering”), and Williams v. Price, 343 F.3d 223, 225 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that Rule 606(b)
“categorically bar[s] juror testimony ‘as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the
jury’s deliberations’ even if the is not offered to explore the jury’s decision-making process in reaching
the verdict” (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 606(b))), with United States v. Henley, 238 F.3d 1111, 1121
(9th Cir. 2001) (citing Hard v. Burlington N. R.R., 812 F.2d 482, 485 (9th Cir. 1987)) (“[E]vidence of
that juror’s alleged racial bias is indisputably admissible for the purposes of determining whether the
juror’s responses [during voir dire] were truthful”) and United States v. Villar, 586 F.3d 76, 87 (1st Cir.
2009) (“[T]he rule against juror impeachment cannot be applied so inflexibly as to bar juror testimony
in those rare and grave cases where claims of racial or ethnic bias during jury deliberations implicate a
defendant’s right to due process and an impartial jury.”).
56. Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946).
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community.” Accordingly, it singles out for fair representation in the
jury pool certain socially salient groups like sex or race whose
membership tends to occasion valued “qualities of human nature and
varieties of human experience,” and whose systematic exclusion would
accordingly “deprive[] the jury of a perspective on human events that
58
may have unsuspected importance in any case that may be presented.”
Meanwhile, the objective ideal helps explain the Supreme Court’s
Batson line of cases that forbid the exercise of peremptory challenges to
59
prevent a prospective juror from serving on the jury based on the same
assumption that those same socially salient group “differences may
60
produce a difference in outlook.” Each of these ideals has much to
commend it. Yet neither is complete on its own. What leaves both the
objective and subjective ideals deficient is the extent to which they
presuppose a conception of juror bias that treats every outside source of
juror influence the same. These two ideals of the jury share a fundamental
flaw: failure to distinguish good influences from bad.
B. The Monolithic Conception of Bias
The Supreme Court has defined bias on the jury as an individual
“state of mind,” suggesting that a juror “will not act with entire
57. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975). The Court appears to have cabined this concept
of “diffused impartiality” to the context of death-qualified juries. See Reid Hastie et al., Inside the
Jury 11 (1983).
58. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503−04 (1972) (citations omitted); see, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana,
419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) (invalidating law that exempted from jury service women who had not made
declaration of willingness to serve); Thiel, 328 U.S. at 223 (striking down a jury selection method
excluding low wage laborers). The Court has made clear that this fair cross-section mandate applies
only to the venire of potential jurors, and not to the petit of actual jurors. See, e.g., Apodaca v. Oregon,
406 U.S. 404, 411−13 (1972). It serves as more than a democratic check, however, on the judges,
prosecutors, and police who direct the criminal justice system. See Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530; Lockhart v.
McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 174−75 (1986). It is also, the Court has affirmed, “a means of assuring . . . an
impartial” jury. Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 480 (1990). This inclusionary element of impartiality,
although it applies only to the venire, reinforces that “one of the most important functions any jury
can perform . . . is to maintain a link between [its verdict and] contemporary community values.”
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 n.15 (1968). This prohibition on empaneling a jury composed
of people who come from “only special segments of the populace,” Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530, also helps
to explain why just one state (Delaware) sanctions special expert juries in complex civil litigation, and
even a Delaware court noted that exclusive juries are “contrary to fundamental concepts of jury trial
and would substitute a method of selection that is inconsistent with established principles of justice.”
See Bradley v. A. C. & S. Co., 1989 WL 70834, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. May 23, 1989); see also James
Oldham, Trial by Jury: The Seventh Amendment and Anglo-American Special Juries 177 (2006)
(“Elite special juries surely are antithetical to the hard-fought, long-delayed goal of opening up jury
service to everyone.”).
59. See generally Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); see also J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.,
511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994) (extending Batson’s ban on race-based juror exclusion to gender-based
peremptory challenges); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992) (extending Batson to criminal
defendants); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 616 (1991) (extending Batson to
private litigants in civil litigation).
60. See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 156 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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impartiality.” This understanding of bias sweeps more broadly than the
62
immoderation or prejudice that the term usually conveys. On this
account, bias encompasses, beyond just radical intolerance, “any outside
influence” on a juror’s thinking about the case, where “outside” mental
influences comprise those that cannot be traced directly to the evidence
63
and “argument in open court.”
This overarching understanding of bias as any outside influence
resembles in its expansiveness the influential account of bias set forth by
psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky. Kahneman and
Tversky defined bias in terms of any “non-relevant factor” that people
64
use to perceive stimuli, store perceptions, and process memories. They
showed how this bias distorts decisionmaking in “systematic and
65
predictable” ways.
Their “dual process theory” of cognition
distinguishes the automatic kind of thinking that we engage in when we
put one foot in front of the other from the deliberative kind when we
66
make a choice about what to eat.
Dual process theory supplies a corresponding account of mental bias
that distinguishes the automatic kind of non-relevant factors—that affect
our decisions when we think too little—from the deliberative kind—
67
when we think too much. We usually think of racial bias, for example,
as the deliberative kind held by the “juror who believes that blacks are
68
violence prone or morally inferior.” But no less can “subconscious”
fears induce jurors “to credit or discredit white witnesses as opposed to
69
black witnesses,” some Supreme Court justices have recognized, or
70
even serve to “determin[e] the verdict of guilt or innocence.”
It makes no difference for purposes of jury impartiality whether bias
is the automatic or deliberative kind. Impartiality doctrine cares only
about “[t]he point at which” a bias is no longer “too weak to warp the

61. Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430, 432 (1887).
62. See, e.g., Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 550−52 (1994).
63. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).
64. See generally Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow 8, 103, 139−40 (2011).
65. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, 185 Science 1124, 1131 (1974) (discussing common errors in probabilistic reasoning based on such
unreliable evidence as what appears typical (representativeness), what come easily to mind (availability),
and what we learn of first (anchoring)). But see generally Gerd Gigerenzer et al., Simple Heuristics
That Make Us Smart (1999) (arguing that “fast and frugal” mental shortcuts obstruct sound reasoning
less often than they enable people to adapt in rational ways to their environment).
66. See generally Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 65; see also Keith E. Stanovich & Richard F.
West, Individual Differences in Reasoning: Implications for the Rationality Debate?, 23 Behav. & Brain
Sci. 645 (2000) (explaining variations in human reasoning).
67. See Tanja Rapus Benton et al., Eyewitness Memory Is Still Not Common Sense: Comparing Jurors,
Judges and Law Enforcement to Eyewitness Experts, 20 Applied Cognitive Psychol. 115, 119−20 (2006).
68. Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 35 (1986).
69. Id. at 42 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
70. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 68 (1992) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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judgment” but “too strong to suppress.” The distinction between
automatic and deliberative biases still serves the epistemic function that
it is often more difficult to detect automatic biases of which people are
unaware. That people are aware of their deliberative biases, however,
makes it possible to hide or misrepresent them, whether to avoid
revealing unpopular views, to appear evenhanded in a moral culture that
prizes objectivity, or to provide an answer that they think will meet with
72
the judge’s approval.
A “growing body of social science” suggests that simply asking jurors
whether they can be impartial is not likely to reveal with any reliability the
presence or strength of many of the outside influences that they would in
73
fact bring to bear on the questions at trial. For example, social cognition
research suggests that over eighty percent of American whites and Asians
demonstrate at least unconscious bias in favor of whites compared to
74
blacks. Additionally, mock juror studies reveal that this anti-black bias
routinely influences verdicts and sentencing in cases in which a juror’s
75
race differs from the defendant’s.
The limited diagnosticity of self-reported bias casts serious doubt on
the Supreme Court’s enduring confidence in its power as “the only sure

71. Briley v. Commonwealth, 279 S.E.2d 151, 154 (Va. 1981).
72. See Commonwealth v. Laguer, 571 N.E.2d 371, 377 (Mass. 1991) (noting that jurors “may be
unaware” that they harbor some bias or “may have an interest in concealing” it); see also Richard
Seltzer et al., Juror Honesty During the Voir Dire, 19 J. Crim. Just., 451, 453−58 (1991) (discussing bias
gleaned from post-trial interviews with 190 jurors finding disparities between bias reported during
pretrial voir dire).
73. See Chin v. Runnels, 343 F. Supp. 2d 891, 906 (N.D. Cal. 2004); see, e.g., Regina A. Schuller et
al., The Impact of Prejudice Screening Procedures on Racial Bias in the Courtroom, 33 L. & Hum.
Behav. 320, 321 (2009) (demonstrating pervasive unawareness of one’s biases related to race and
arguing that “even if people are able to identify the possibility that they may be biased, . . . they may
not fully understand how and to what extent biases can affect their decisions”).
74. See, e.g., Carol Izumi, Implicit Bias and the Illusion of Mediator Neutrality, 34 Wash. U. J.L. &
Pol’y 71, 93 (2010); Shankar Vedantam, See No Bias, Wash. Post. Mag., Jan. 23, 2005, at 12, 15;
Project Implicit, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit (last visited Apr. 24, 2014). Some scholars
believe that much racial bias tends to resist detection because so many biases operate subconsciously.
See, e.g., Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. Rev. 1124, 1128−32 (2012).
Others think it more plausible that people tend to be aware of their bias but are simply unwilling to
admit how much influence it will have over the decisions they make. See Ralph Richard Banks &
Richard Thompson Ford, (How) Does Unconscious Bias Matter?: Law, Politics, and Racial Inequality,
58 Emory L.J. 1053, 1106−08 (2009); Amy L. Wax, The Discriminating Mind: Define It, Prove It,
40 Conn. L. Rev. 979, 1021−22 (2008). Whether unwitting or disguised, bias frequently eludes not just
self-reports and “evaluations of demeanor evidence.” Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182,
188 (1981). It also evades subliminal evaluative measures such as the Implicit Association Test, which
behavioral psychologists agree cannot diagnose bias reliably enough to distinguish its presence and
force with any precision among individuals. See, e.g., Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through
Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the Law, 58 UCLA L. Rev. 465, 477−80 (2010).
75. See Tara L. Mitchell et al., Racial Bias in Mock Juror Decision-Making: A Meta-Analytic
Review of Defendant Treatment, 29 L. & Hum. Behav. 621, 625, 627−28 (2005) (analyzing thirty-four
juror verdict studies and sixteen juror sentencing studies that employed the experimental manipulation
of a defendant’s race).
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method of fathoming” whether a prospective juror “has an unbiased
77
mind.” Yet much in the law still treats jurors who can “reach a verdict
as free from bias as possible” as the goal toward which jury trials should
78
aspire, at least in theory.
The problem with this aspiration is not just that a truly unbiased
juror, like Hare’s hyper-rational archangel or Star Trek’s humanoid
79
Spock, exists only in analytic philosophy or science fiction. The decision
maker who “strips himself of all predilections[] becomes a passionless
thinking machine,” as Judge Jerome Frank once wrote about judges, and
80
thereby “ceases to be human.” Courts have indeed recognized that it
would be “unrealistic” to expect courts to empanel a jury composed of
individuals who are tantamount to a tabula rasa, and accordingly “free
81
from all” outside sources of mental influence.
The problem is also that bias is “such an elusive condition of the
mind,” as the Supreme Court has lamented, that “it is most difficult, if not
82
impossible, to always recognize its existence.” That prospective jurors
cannot be trusted to disclose or perhaps even know their own biases
leaves trial judges and lawyers in the precarious position of trying to read
their minds in an effort to ascertain outside influences that might affect
the jurors’ decisionmaking about the case.
C. The Emerging Neuroscience of Bias
These attempts at mind reading that take place during voir dire are
not new or strange. Although we cannot see what another person is
thinking, we frequently attribute mental states like fear, anxiety, joy, and
boredom to others by drawing inferences from what we perceive from
one’s tone of voice, facial expression, or body language. Behavioral
observation can be an unreliable gauge of mental states, however, because
of its vulnerability to deceit and basic reliance on unsubstantiated hunches
83
and folk psychology. Even the most reliable available psychological
76. Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 313−14 n.3 (1931) (“[T]o ask a person whether he is
[biased] . . . is, probably, the only sure method of fathoming his thoughts and feelings.” (quoting
People v. Reyes, 5 Cal. 347, 349 (1855)).
77. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 n.7 (1982) (“[S]urely [a juror] who is trying . . . to live up to
the sanctity of his oath is well qualified to say whether he has an unbiased mind.”) (quoting Dennis v.
United States, 339 U.S. 162, 171 (1950)).
78. In re Adams, 421 F. Supp. 1027, 1030 (D.C. Mich. 1976).
79. See James J. Gobert, In Search of the Impartial Jury, 79 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 269, 324
(1988) (arguing that the illusion of jurors who are impartial in the sense that they are without bias
“may be worth preserving” to sustain “[p]ublic confidence in the legal system”).
80. In re J.P. Linahan, Inc., 138 F.2d 650, 652−53 (2d Cir. 1943).
81. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 305 A.2d 5, 8 (Pa. 1973).
82. Smith, 455 U.S. at 231 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S.
183, 196 (1909)).
83. See Morris B. Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges Should Be Abolished: A Trial Judge’s
Perspective, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 809, 840, 863 (1997).
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measures like the Implicit Association Test (“IAT”) cannot detect bias
84
with any precision at the individual level.
Because such tools cannot discern “the precise psychological
processes through which the influence of” factors deemed irrelevant to a
decisionmaking context “occur[] in the legal context,” these tools have
been unable to answer a number of fundamental questions about the
85
control and manifestation of bias. To wit: To what extent, and under
which conditions, can people control biases? Why do so many people fail
to control the very biases that they claim to reject on reflection? Why can
86
some people control those biases better than others? These are among
87
the kinds of questions about bias that neuroscience has begun to answer.
I must begin by underscoring how preliminary this research is,
especially in view of the complexity of the mental processes at issue. Many
of these studies suppose a misrepresentative one-to-one correlation
between neural activity in a particular area of the brain and a mental
state that the activity is said to represent. But the neural activity
responsible for most mental states is in fact distributed across several
88
different areas of the brain.
In the case of automatic biases, researchers have identified as crucial
the amygdala, which comprises a pair of small, almond-sized brain areas
normally associated with subconscious processing like fear conditioning,
89
memory retrieval, and emotional learning. But singling out automatic
bias is not as simple as identifying whether a person’s amygdala lights up
when she is shown relevant stimuli. This is in part because other parts of
the brain are also involved in the operation of the same processes,
including the anterior cingulated cortex, medial temporal lobe, and
90
fusiform face area.

84. See Kang et al., supra note 74, at 1129−33; see also Justin D. Levinson & Danielle Young,
Different Shades of Bias: Skin Tone, Implicit Racial Bias, and Judgments of Ambiguous Evidence, 112 W.
Va. L. Rev. 307, 336−39 (2010) (arguing that implicit racial bias explains the statistically significant
difference that the subtle manipulation of skin color made in mock juror perceptions of defendant guilt,
even when subjects could not recall the defendant’s race); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious
Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1195, 1226−31 (2009) (canvassing studies that
use the Implicit Association Test (“IAT”) and similar psychological measures to argue that certain people
are sometimes able to control the kind of automatic bias that operates unconsciously).
85. Samuel R. Sommers, Race and the Decision Making of Juries, 12 Legal & Criminological
Psychol. 171, 172 (2007).
86. See generally, Emily Pronin, Perception and Misperception of Bias in Human Judgment,
11 Trends Cognitive Sci. 37 (2007) (explaining why people often fail to report their own bias).
87. See generally David M. Amodio & Kyle G. Ratner, The Neuroscience of Social Cognition, in
The Oxford Handbook of Social Cognition 702 (Donald E. Carlston ed., 2013).
88. See, e.g., id. at 703−04.
89. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Phelps et al., Performance on Indirect Measures of Race Evaluation
Predicts Amygdala Activation, 12 J. Cognitive Neuroscience 729, 729−30 (2000).
90. See Austen Krill & Steven M. Platek, In-Group and Out-Group Membership Mediates Anterior
Cingulate Activation to Social Exclusion, 1 Frontiers Evolutionary Neuroscience 1, 6 (2009).
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Functional brain imaging over time (as opposed to static structural
imaging) measures certain changes in the brainlike blood flows or
electrical waveswhile a subject is engaged in a particular cognitive or
91
motor activity or experiences a particular emotional or mental state.
Social neuroscientists Elizabeth Phelps and Alan Hart were the first to
use functional magnetic resonance imaging (“fMRI”) to observe the
increased levels of blood oxygen that flow to brain regions associated
with certain attitudes or stereotypes while subjects were subliminally
92
presented with the faces of people from races other than their own.
An fMRI registers brain activity indirectly by observing increases in
93
blood flow to deliver needed oxygen to active neurons. More precisely,
the influx of oxygenated blood is thought to point to parts of the brain
that require the recovery of lost oxygen due to performance of neural
94
activity immediately prior, as indicated by those higher oxygen levels.
The blood flow that fMRI measures is a delayed proxy for certain kinds
95
of neural activity, and even then at poor spatial resolution.
Whatever window fMRI provides into mental states accordingly
96
comes “through a scanner darkly.” The workings of the human mind
are so complex that there might never be a brain imaging technology
capable of predicting with reliability or confidence the effect of particular
outside mental influences on a person’s decisionmaking about the legal
97
issues at trial. Some neuroscientists nevertheless believe that brain
imaging might be able to improve our ability to uncover outside sources
of mental influence because neural scans might be able to uncover—
better than behavioral observation or reaction-time tests could—whether
jurors are lying, even to themselves, about the influences that affect the
98
way they think and the decisions they make.
Current neuroscience research into bias chiefly concerns attitudes and
stereotypes about race. These studies suggest that the extent to which a
person who holds an unwanted racial bias can control it has to do with her

91. See John C. Gore, Principles and Practice of Functional MRI of the Human Brain, 112 J.
Clinical Investigation 4, 4 (2003).
92. See Phelps et al., supra note 89, at 730; Allen J. Hart et al., Differential Response in the
Human Amygdala to Racial Outgroup vs lngroup Face Stimuli, 11 NeuroReport 2351, 2351−52 (2000).
93. Elizabeth M.C. Hillman, Coupling Mechanism and Significance of the BOLD Signal: A Status
Report, 37 Ann. Rev. Neuroscience (forthcoming 2014).
94. Id.
95. See, e.g., David M. Amodio et al., Neural Signals for the Detection of Unintentional Race Bias,
15 Psychol. Sci. 88, 92−93 (2004) (discussing the anterior cingulate and prefrontal cortex regions of
the brain in association with the conflict detection and regulatory systems).
96. Teneille Brown & Emily Murphy, Through a Scanner Darkly: Functional Neuroimaging as
Evidence of a Criminal Defendant’s Past Mental States, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 1119, 1119 (2010).
97. See Emily R. Murphy & Henry T. Greely, What Will Be the Limits of Neuroscience-Based
Mindreading in the Law?, in Oxford Handbook of Neuroethics 635, 642 (Judy Illes & Barbara J.
Sahakian eds., 2011).
98. See Robert J. Sternberg, Cognitive Psychology 41−42, 47−48 (5th ed. 2009).
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reasons for wanting to control that bias once it becomes apparent. What
matters is whether her desire to control it owes more to external reasons
for avoiding disapproval than it does to internal reasons stemming from
100
personal values.
Experiments with fMRI reveal differences in a
person’s brain activity when her effort to control bias is more externally
motivated, as when she knows that she is being watched within a racially
salient decisionmaking context, than when her effort is more internally
motivated, as when race is less salient and she believes that no one else is
101
looking. Neuroscientists have found that the frontal brain regions that
govern cognitive inhibition and executive function processes exert
demonstrably less activity when primarily internally motivated subjects,
who are far more successful at controlling bias than their externally
motivated counterparts, engage in control strategies such as reappraisal
102
and detachment.
Building on this research, one striking recent study used fMRI
analysis to predict the impact of racial bias on jury verdicts “more
103
effectively” than behavioral or psychological measures. Brain imaging
enabled researchers to predict with greater accuracy than the IAT how
much money nineteen subjects (all of them white) would award victims
of different races in an otherwise identical employment discrimination
104
case. The mock jurors read short vignettes about an employment
discrimination case and reported the amount of money they would award
105
the victims. The subjects thereafter took the IAT and their brains were
scanned with the fMRI while they looked at black and white faces paired
106
with positive and negative adjectives.
The researchers who designed that study looked at neural activity in
107
regions of the brain associated with the automatic kind of racial bias.
Having identified a strong correlation between award size and neural
activity, but no such correlation between verdict size and IAT scores,

99. See Sarah Banks et al., Amygdala-frontal Connectivity During Emotion Regulation, 2 Soc.
Cognitive & Affective Neuroscience 303, 303 (2007) (discussing involvement of frontal cortical
regions in modulating amygdale reactivity and mediating emotion regulation).
100. See Patricia G. Devine & Lindsay B. Sharp, Automaticity and Control in Stereotyping and
Prejudice, in Handbook of Prejudice, Stereotyping, and Discrimination 61, 77−80 (Todd D. Nelson
ed., 2009).
101. See, e.g., Sam J. Gilbert et al., Evaluative vs. Trait Representation in Intergroup Social Judgments:
Distinct Roles of Anterior Temporal Lobe and Prefrontal Cortex, 50 Neuropsychologia 3600, 3609 (2012).
102. See, e.g., Kevin N. Ochsner & James J. Gross, Cognitive Emotion Regulation: Insights from
Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 17 Current Directions Psychol. Sci. 153, 154−57 (2008).
103. Harrison A. Korn et al., Neurolaw: Differential Brain Activity for Black and White Faces
Predicts Damage Awards in Hypothetical Employment Discrimination Cases, 7 Soc. Neuroscience
398, 398−99, 407 (2012).
104. See id. at 400, 404.
105. See id. at 400−01.
106. See id. at 400−02.
107. Id. at 404 (assessing the right inferior frontal gyrus and superior/middle parietal lobule).

H - Fox_17 (M. STEVENS) (Do Not Delete)

1016

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

5/26/2014 10:44 AM

[Vol. 65:999

they contended “that neuroimaging data can measure a racial bias . . .
108
reflected in juror decisions more effectively than . . . the IAT.” The
researchers expressly rejected the suggestion “that potential jurors be
put in an magnetic resonance imaging (“MRI”) machine during jury
109
selection for cases where race is salient.” But why not embrace neuro110
voir dire if it were suitably reliable and feasible to implement?

II. Brain Imaging and Juror Bias
The early state of this bias research warrants the “neuromodesty”
111
that Stephen Morse cautions in drawing legal conclusions. But we
should not fail to draw lessons from brain imaging studies to the extent
that they supply well-supported theories or push us to think in new ways
about the law.
The case in which the Supreme Court extended the impartiality
mandate from criminal to civil trials involved an equal protection
challenge to the use of peremptory strikes against potential jurors based
112
on race. Litigant participation in the selection of jurors promotes the
perception of legitimacy, but trading on “race stereotypes” exacts too
high a price, Justice Kennedy held for the Court, “for acceptance of a
113
jury panel as fair.” Justice Kennedy explained that “if a litigant
believes that [a] prospective juror harbors” any outside influence that
114
renders him biased, “the issue can be explored in a rational way.”
This Part imagines a neuroscientifically rational way to detect and
eliminate such outside influences during jury selection. It argues that
adoption of this neuro-voir dire is worth resisting because it carries to full
expression the bankrupt concept of monolithic bias that much of our jury
doctrine and theory presupposes.
A. Neuro-Voir Dire
The emerging neuroscience discussed in Part I invites a thought
experiment to evaluate the monolithic conception of bias that is included
in any outside source of juror influence. Imagine if brain imaging were
developed to the point at which it could reliably identify prospective
108. Id. at 407. Beyond the usual methodological problems with applying the results of mock jury
studies to real-world trial settings, the study’s use of a small and homogenous sample cautions against
making too much of its findings. See id.
109. Id.
110. Apart from fMRI’s insufficiently proven reliability to detect bias, the authors give as reasons
just that “[t]he cost of doing so would be prohibitive, many people might feel it is overly invasive, and
. . . courts have been hesitant to allow neuroimaging data to be used in trials.” Id.
111. See generally Stephen J. Morse, Avoiding Irrational NeuroLaw Exuberance: A Plea for
Neuromodesty, 62 Mercer L. Rev. 837 (2011) (addressing claims about criminal responsibility).
112. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 628−29 (1991).
113. Id. at 630.
114. Id. at 631.
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jurors who arrive at trial affected by any extra-trial influence that
appears relevant to the case. Courts could then use this perfect
technology of bias detection, referred to as neuro-voir dire, to weed out
individuals who harbor any outside influence with enough strength as it
relates to a particular trial.
This analytic invention is designed, like Plato’s cave, Descartes’s evil
demon, and Hobbes’ state of nature, to provoke a new way to think
115
about an old problem. Neuro-voir dire occasions us in a fresh and
powerful way to ask whether the juror who lacks “any prepossessions
whatever” would be so “extremely desirable,” as Chief Justice Marshall
put it in Burr, that such a juror, however fictional, stands as the model
116
toward which jury selection and trial procedures should aspire. Would
the adoption of brain imaging techniques that could detect jury bias hold
117
the appeal that much of the impartiality jurisprudence assumes?
Whatever hesitation we would have about neuro-voir dire cannot lie
just in the fact that brain imaging is, for now, too expensive or
cumbersome to administer. It is true that the $500 or so that it costs to
perform a brain image today makes it impossible to scan every person
118
called for jury service. The price may, however, come down over time.
Logistics pose another challenge. The fMRI machine, for example,
119
requires subjects to lie still inside a large magnet. Yet scientists are
developing wireless neuroimaging that does not require such restriction
120
of movement.
Prospective jurors might still of course balk at the prospect of brain
imaging at the courthouse. But foot dragging alone would hardly be
sufficient reason to abandon measures that vindicate the constitutional
guarantee of jury impartiality. If we suppose that neuroimaging could
detect bias reliably, affordably, and conveniently, what explains the
lingering unease that its adoption would inspire? The most obvious
objection is that brain scanning jurors might infringe upon their cognitive
privacy. The next Subpart examines that plausible but unsatisfying
privacy-based objection to neuro-voir dire.

115. See Dennett, supra note 29, at 6.
116. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49, 50−51 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692g).
117. See supra notes 17−20, 40−43 and accompanying text.
118. See Cost & Billing, Univ. Mich. fMRI Lab., http://fmri.research.umich.edu/users/billing.php
(last visited Apr. 24, 2014).
119. See generally Douglas C. Noll, A Primer on MRI and Functional MRI (Dep’t of Biomed.
Eng’g & Radiology, Univ. Mich., No. 2.1, 2001), available at http://web.eecs.umich.edu/~dnoll/
primer2.pdf.
120. See, e.g., Yoko Hoshi et al., Movable Cognitive Studies with a Portable, Telemetric NearInfrared Spectroscopy System, 13 NeuroImage S18, S18 (2001) (noting that it is unclear whether such
wireless imaging will enable measures of brain activity that are as precise as fMRI).
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B. Juror Privacy Interests
Citizens who are called for jury service enjoy a qualified privacy
right against being forced to disclose certain personal information, even
121
if only to the inquiring trial lawyer or judge. Juror privacy interests
vary as a function of, first, the sensitivity of the information that is being
122
solicited and, second, its materiality to concerns about bias on the jury.
Only if material information cannot be obtained less intrusively have
juror privacy interests been held to yield to a defendant’s right to an
123
impartial jury. Consider, for example, that federal law bars a juror’s
124
“exclusion from service” on the basis of religion. But questions that go
to her faith or affiliation are permitted if a religious figure or institution
is a party, witness, or victim, or where the juror’s religion appears likely
to figure prominently at trial, as in prosecutions for polygamy or
125
abortion, for example.
On this account, neuro-voir dire appears to pose a serious threat to
juror privacy. Brain scanning could reveal sensitive personal information,
after all, that a person would not wish to share or may not even yet know
to be true. This privacy concern about forced brain imaging for bias goes
beyond discovering information that traditional juror questioning and
observation cannot. I have argued in the self-incrimination context that
the content of private information matters less than control over “the use
126
and disclosure of [one’s] thoughts.”
This concept of mental control is the best way to think about
cognitive privacy interests in the context of jury selection. Even if the
court does not disclose whatever information that brain imaging gleans,
neuro-voir dire risks unwanted access to representations of the subjective
beliefs that “anchor each of us as an individual person with an
127
uninterrupted autobiographical narrative.” Our individual identities
quite plausibly comprise little more than the memories and experiences
that make up the patchwork of our potentially scannable thoughts—what
128
most of us “think of as most important about who we are.”
But the stakes differ between criminal suspects and potential jurors.
In the Fifth Amendment context, the point of brain imaging would be to
121. United States v. Workman, 454 F.2d 1124, 1128−29 (9th Cir. 1971), reh’g denied, 409 U.S. 857
(1972).
122. A distinct dimension of juror privacy, less relevant to my inquiry, concerns how widely that
information is disclosed. E.g., United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 140−41 (2d Cir. 1979).
123. See, e.g., Paula L. Hannaford, Safeguarding Juror Privacy: A New Framework for Court
Policies and Procedures, 85 Judicature 18, 23 (2001).
124. 28 U.S.C. § 1862 (2003).
125. See State v. Barnett, 445 P.2d 124, 125 (Ore. 1968).
126. Fox, supra note 26, at 796.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 796−97. For a critique of my position, see Kiel Brennan-Marquez, A Modest Defense of
Mind Reading, 15 Yale J.L. & Tech. 214, 257−58, 262−64 (2013).
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supply evidence about whether a person committed a crime. For the
Sixth Amendment, by contrast, it is to determine whether a person’s state
of mind qualifies her to serve at trial. With the right to silence at stake, the
chief state interest is solving crime; with impartiality, it is securing a fair
129
trial. So for self-incrimination, conviction and punishment loom over
brain scanning. In the case of bias, the threatened consequence is being
130
dismissed from the jury.
No less in jury selection than criminal interrogations, however, does
compelled brain imaging imperil the individual’s mental control.
Ordinary voir dire leaves a person free to refuse to disclose intimate
131
details; she need simply not answer the questions. Neuro-voir dire
deprives her of that choice, by contrast, because it extracts visual pictures
meant to represent her “inner sanctum of individual feeling and thought,”
132
as the Supreme Court has put it in the self-incrimination context.
Yet a juror’s privacy interests in her “mental control” fails to capture,
at least fully or convincingly, the unwillingness that many share to accept
brain imaging for all juror bias, even if it is safe, noninvasive, and reliable.
In the context of jury selection, privacy interests are declined the
constitutional status of the impartiality right that voir dire seeks to
vindicate.
It is true that juror privacy interests weigh more heavily in civil cases
than criminal cases. The loss of liberty that criminal prosecution
threatens to a defendant makes her impartiality right more critical in that
context. But even in civil trials, the Supreme Court has declined
constitutional status to the juror privacy interest in ways that cannot
133
override the decidedly constitutional right to an impartial jury.
That cognitive privacy does not provide a dispositive reason to resist
neuro-voir dire for all outside influences suggests that this high-tech
practice resembles the low-tech methods of bias detection that we accept.
Whether interrogation of potential jurors takes the form of oral
interviews, computer questionnaires, IATs, or brain imaging, it aims all
134
the same to “eliminat[e] [the] extremes of partiality on both sides.”
C. Rethinking the Analogy
If not privacy-based concerns about mental control, what is the
relevant moral or legal difference between crude and sophisticated

129. See Ronald J. Allen, Theorizing Self-Incrimination, 30 Cardozo L. Rev. 729, 732, 736−37
(2008) (arguing that privacy interests permit compelled disclosures from criminal suspects).
130. The brain-scanned juror may also risk revealing sensitive proclivities or prejudices.
131. Brandborg v. Lucas, 891 F. Supp. 352, 360 (E.D. Tex. 1995).
132. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 233 (1975) (quoting Couch v. United States, 409 U.S.
85, 90–91 (1974)).
133. See Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 511 (1984).
134. Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 484 (1990) (quoting Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965)).
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measures of getting at juror biases? To put the question another way:
assuming there is nothing wrong with asking potential jurors, whether in
words or writing, about their personal habits or convictions, why should we
136
worry about like-minded attempts that enlist novel brain-based means?
Neuro-voir dire does not in fact represent any radical departure
from existing jury selection practices. This resemblance does not,
however, justify a futuristic method by appeal to the familiar. Instead, it
gives reason to reevaluate the monolithic conception of juror bias that
animates both. Neuro-voir dire is troubling because it draws out the full
implications of treating all outside sources of juror influence the same.
We have not until now been forced to confront those implications
because when it comes to juror bias, “it is most difficult, if not impossible,
137
to always recognize its existence.” We have seen how jurors can be as
oblivious to the automatic bias they harbor as they are good at hiding
138
deliberative bias. Even voir dire’s defenders concede that its reliance
on the assessment of jurors’ voluntary responses and demeanor leaves
judges and lawyers bound to miss many of the “biases and opinions that
139
will inevitably influence their decisions and perceptions.”
But neuro-voir dire suffers from no such epistemic shortcomings.
This neurotechnological means of identifying jury bias wholesale would
make only “more opaque and obscure” the complexity of those outside
140
influences that its adoption seeks to uproot. “When a machine runs
efficiently,” after all, “one need focus only on its inputs and outputs and
141
not on its internal complexity.”
The term bias sweeps so broadly in the doctrine and literature that
no uniform approach that conceives of every such “extrajudicial
142
143
source” of “outside influence” the same way could preserve the
appropriate balance between the objective and subjective ideals of the
jury. The preoccupations and parochialisms through which jurors’ minds
filter the testimony at trial vary not just in terms of whether those biases
operate consciously or resist control, but in terms of their moral valence
and reflection of social mores. Bigotry should not be treated like

135. Cf. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963−64 (2012) (comparing suspect privacy interests
at stake in police tracking through routine tailing via car versus space-based satellite navigation).
136. See supra text accompanying notes 119−120.
137. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 231 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Crawford v.
United States, 212 U.S. 183, 196 (1909)).
138. See, e.g., Mary R. Rose & Shari Seidman Diamond, Judging Bias: Juror Confidence and
Judicial Rulings on Challenges for Cause, 42 Law & Soc’y Rev. 513, 516−17 (2008).
139. Barbara Allen Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving “Its Wonderful Power”, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 545,
551 (1975).
140. Bruno Latour, Pandora’s Hope: Essays on the Reality of Science Studies 304 (1999).
141. Id.
142. Vermeule, supra note 40, at 403 (internal quotation marks omitted).
143. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).
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empathy, nor personal vendettas like regional values. That we would
reject neuro-voir dire presses us to see that the impartiality mandate
requires more than the absence of whatever bias is taken to mean.
Neuro-voir dire, no less than ordinary voir dire, is misguided for the
reason and to the extent that it treats every outside source of juror
influence the same way and thus fails to appreciate important moral
differences among them. What we need is a more precise way to think
and talk about the multiplicity of the outside mental influences on
potential jurors that go by the name of bias.

III. The Cognitive Bias Spectrum
This Part develops a novel conceptual framework with which to
evaluate those biases that find the most prominent expression in jury law
and theory. This Article distinguishes four categories of outside
influence. What I call personal interests comprise the self-regarding kinds
of influence that arise when the outcome in a case has implications for
the welfare of a juror’s family or fortune. Community interests consist of
local area norms that a juror identifies with, or expectations in the region
affected by the dispute with which he feels pressure to conform. Casespecific beliefs spring from juror exposure to out-of-court facts or rumors
about the particular people or events at trial. Case-general beliefs are
attitudes about social groups or ideologies that bear relevance to the trial
more broadly.
Unraveling the monolith of bias along this spectrum of cognitive
biases helps to reconcile the objective and subjective ideals of the jury. I
argue that trial courts can vindicate the objective ideal of the jury by
expanding the grounds for exclusion for cause to cover two categories of
juror bias: personal interests in the case, whether social or financial, and
case-specific beliefs arising from pretrial facts or rumors about the
parties or events. The subjective ideal of the jury in turn calls for greater
solicitude with respect to community interests and case-general beliefs
about broadly relevant social groups or causes. Rather than questioning
jurors regarding these categories of bias, I would implement several biastempering mechanisms to mitigate the accompanying risk that juries
would refuse to follow the law, be unable to agree on a verdict, or permit
unjust considerations to influence their decisionmaking.
A. Vindicating the Objective Ideal
The objective ideal of the jury is of recent vintage. Until the
eighteenth century, trials were decided by jurors already familiar with
144
the dispute being litigated. Jurors were chosen precisely because of
144. See e.g., John Marshall Mitnick, From Neighbor-Witness to Judge of Proofs: The
Transformation of the English Civil Juror, 32 Am. J. Legal Hist. 201, 206−29 (1988).
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their prior knowledge of the events or about the people at issue. That
prerevolutionary vision of jurors prized their acquaintance with the
146
parties and their conflict. The institution that we know as the jury was
147
forged in opposition to the model of jurors as witness-neighbors. The
American tradition seeks jurors who are unfamiliar with the people or
148
events at trial.
Information about the case that is not admitted into evidence,
whether acquired through social media or word of mouth, uniformly
erodes the requisite balance of objectivity on the jury. Exposure to such
fact or rumor that so closely resembles the evidence presented at trial
does not simply cloud or confound jurors’ consideration of that evidence
but risks supplanting it altogether and thus depriving the parties of the
opportunity for cross-examination, which courts have long regarded as
149
the “greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.”
Mistrust of exposure to out-of-court rumor and publicity is in this sense
similar to the epistemic and unfairness rationales for excluding evidence
150
such as hearsay and perhaps prior misconduct. The constitutional
bedrock that jurors come to a trial relatively unaware of the facts
explains why the jury doctrine rightly resists, wholesale, this category of
biases that I refer to as case-specific beliefs.
There is a second category of outside influence whose presence
should, without exception, disqualify a juror when it appears with
sufficient force. The impartiality mandate requires not just ignorance of
facts beyond the testimony. It also insists that jurors stand at a certain
distance from the people and matters involved. Even the “selfinforming” jury excluded prospective jurors who were related to the
151
parties or had property riding on the outcome. Social affections or
stock holdings breed the self-serving conflicts of interest that explain why
bribes and threats so corrupt jury decisionmaking.
A juror who herself is a party to a case is paradigmatic of what I call
personal interests. It is a “mainstay of our system of government,” the
Supreme Court asserts, that “[n]o man is allowed to be a judge in his own
145. See, e.g., Steven A. Engel, The Public’s Vicinage Right: A Constitutional Argument, 75 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 1658, 1674 (2000) (arguing that citizens who possessed personal knowledge of the events that gave
rise to the legal dispute, and consequently were thought to be best positioned to adjudicate it).
146. See, e.g., S. Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344, 2353 (2012).
147. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Spandrel or Frankenstein’s Monster? The Vices and Virtues of
Retrofitting in American Law, 54 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 339, 341 (2012).
148. See Engel, supra note 145, at 1693 (noting that “modern courts disfavor jurors with specific
knowledge of the parties or the crime”).
149. United States v. Evans, 216 F.3d 80, 85 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S.
149, 158 (1970)).
150. Cf. Richard D. Friedman, Minimizing the Jury Over-Valuation Concern, 2003 Mich. St. L.
Rev. 967, 967−68 (arguing that the dominant reason that evidence law excludes hearsay, character, and
prior misconduct evidence is a fear that juries will value it too highly).
151. See Daniel Klerman, Was the Jury Ever Self-Informing?, 77 S. Cal. L. Rev. 123, 133−34 (2003).
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cause, because his interest would certainly bias his judgment.” Even a
scholar like Adrian Vermeule, who has argued that institutional designers
often do well to depart from the axiom against deciding one’s own case,
champions “rules for selecting petit juries [that] exclude jurors” with any
153
such personal interests.
1. Personal Interests
First consider the personal interests that pull at jurors’ heart and
purse strings. Personal interests relate to a potential juror’s social or
economic ties to a party or other prominent participant in the trial. There
is a core of this self-regard within concentric circles that extends outward,
from standing in judgment of one’s family or friends, to deciding cases
154
that implicate gradually attenuated professional or pecuniary stakes.
These conflicts of interest subvert the measure of objectivity required for
155
a juror’s even-handed application of the facts to the law.
If the juror believes that the outcome in a case could impact her
intimates or bank account, the impulse is to decide it in a way that helps
her friend, hurts her enemy, preserves her wealth, grinds an axe, or
indulges a grudge. Because “every man is presumed to do all things in
order to his own benefit,” Thomas Hobbes wrote, “no man is a fit
156
arbitrator in his own cause.” The reason to weed out from the jury
those personal interests located near the center is not just that they tend
to be so persuasive, but also that they run roughshod over the objective
ideal of the jury.
a. Social
Most of us enjoy relationships with family and friends whose wellbeing matters to us. The presence or relevance of people like these
within the context of trial predictably encourages jurors to displace the
157
consideration of truth and justice with regard for self or loved ones. A
juror’s relationship with a party, lawyer, victim, or witness naturally
affects her thinking about that person’s arguments, testimony, or
158
outcomes.
Relatives and companions will of course tend to have a stronger pull
than neighbors or colleagues. Brain imaging studies indeed confirm that

152. Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 428 (1995) (citations omitted) (internal
quotations marks omitted).
153. Vermeule, supra note 40, at 402.
154. Id. at 390−91.
155. See id. at 400 (discussing tradeoffs of efficiency, expertise, and independence).
156. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 102 (Michael Oakeshott ed., Macmillan 1947) (1651).
157. See, e.g., John A. Bargh & Erin L. Williams, The Automaticity of Social Life, 15 Current
Directions Psychol. Sci. 1, 4 (2006).
158. See, e.g., Estrada v. Scribner, 512 F.3d 1227, 1241 (9th Cir. 2008).
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people who have greater individual meaning are “more likely to [elicit]
selective excitatory responses” than strangers or celebrities with whom
159
we have only generalized familiarity.
The point is not, however, that more wide-ranging or intense
memories or involvement with another person will make it more likely
that his prominent place at trial will “influence the information recalled”
160
or the way that jurors perceive or process information. It is that the
influence of such personal interests characteristically disfigures the
conditions required for objective decisionmaking.
b. Financial
A second kind of personal interest arises under circumstances in
which a potential juror or her close relation has a nontrivial monetary
stake in how the case is resolved. A juror who holds stock in a corporation
that is a named party, for example, would thereby have financial interests
161
in the case that a juror who uses that corporation’s products would not.
Similar financial interests arise for an employee or clerk, landlord or
tenant, principal or agent, debtor or creditor, business partner or surety
on any bond to either party. As the prospect of fiscal reward increases—
due to the larger or more direct pecuniary incentives at stake—the
release of dopamine to the reward system of the brain also increases in a
way that is similar to that of people who are addicted to a controlled drug
162
respond to its use.
The Supreme Court, “while recognizing that persons of the ‘highest
honor and greatest self-sacrifice’ would not be influenced by fear of
financial losses, has said that . . . ‘[such] temptation to the average man as
163
a judge . . . denies the [accused] due process of law.’” What makes such
interests corrosive of the kinds of jurors we want is not that they tend to
exert such great psychological influence, but that the self-regarding logic
they promote collides with the provision of other-regarding justice. Some
jurors may be less personally interested, however, by contrast to the rule

159. Indre V. Viskontas et al., Human Medial Temporal Lobe Neurons Respond Preferentially to
Personally Relevant Images, 106 Proc. Nat’l Acad. Sci. 21329, 21331 (2009) .
160. Alisha C. Holland & Elizabeth A. Kensinger, Review: Emotion and Autobiographical
Memory, 7 Physics Life Rev. 88, 88 (2010).
161. See, e.g., Chestnut v. Ford Motor Co., 445 F.2d 967, 971 (4th Cir. 1971) (“That a stockholder
in a company which is a party to a lawsuit is incompetent to sit as juror is so well settled as to be black
letter law.”).
162. Hans C. Breiter et al., Functional Imaging of Neural Responses to Expectancy and Experience
of Monetary Gains and Losses, 30 Neuron 619, 634 (2001).
163. Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 176 (1950) (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting Tumey v.
Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927)).
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of necessity that authorizes judges to determine the constitutionality of
164
changes to their salaries.
2. Case-Specific Beliefs
A distinct source of outside influence arises under conditions in
which a potential juror has (or believes she has) knowledge of or
familiarity with information related to the case that was not admitted at
trial. Such information might be acquired either through direct
experience with the events or people at trial or through social rumor,
media reports, or exposure to earlier proceedings in the case or another
165
between the same parties. This is the kind of bias that defense attorney
Don West alluded to when in his opening statement he began: “Knockknock. Who’s there? George Zimmerman. George Zimmerman, who?
166
Alright good. You’re on the jury.”
What makes case-specific beliefs such as antecedent knowledge
about the defendant so disquieting is not just that their resemblance to
the evidence at trial makes jurors especially susceptible to influence.
Experimental studies have demonstrated the frequently significant
influence that inadmissible information about a party or events has on
167
juror thinking. Beyond the distinctive power to persuade, however, casespecific beliefs are predictably one-sided and undermine the objective
ideal by depriving the side that they skew against of the opportunity to
168
contest their truth in the court of law.
Justice Kennedy has usefully divided the relevant precedents
regarding what I call case-specific beliefs into two categories. First are
cases involving the narrow propagation of those beliefs; second are those
involving the pervasive kind of exposure that creates an “atmosphere so
corruptive of the trial process that . . . a fair trial could not be held
169
[there], nor an impartial jury assembled.”

164. See, e.g., United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 215 (1980). For further discussion, see Vermeule,
supra note 40, at 408−09.
165. See Leonard v. United States, 378 U.S. 544, 544 (1964) (per curiam) (reversing conviction because a
juror had heard announcement of defendant’s guilty verdict on similar charges in an earlier trial).
166. Adam Goldberg, George Zimmerman’s Lawyer Tells ‘Knock-Knock’ Joke at Trial,
Huffington Post (June 24, 2013, 1:45 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/24/georgezimmerman-knock-knock_n_3491367.html; see Mike Schneider, George Zimmerman Trial: Social
Media Infiltrates Trial, Huffington Post (July 7, 2013, 10:27 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2013/07/07/george-zimmerman-trial-social-media-infiltrates-trial_n_3557734.html.
167. See, e.g., Christina A. Studebaker & Steven D. Penrod, Pretrial Publicity: The Media, the Law,
and Common Sense, 3 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 428, 436−37 (1997).
168. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
169. Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 448 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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a. Narrow
Courts determine the suitability of narrow case-specific beliefs on a
juror-by-juror basis by reference to the content and acquisition of
170
information about the people or events at trial. Content-based inquiry
goes to how directly that information relates to the case and whether it
171
communicates opinion rather than fact. As to its acquisition, courts ask
how recently the exposure took place and how reliable its source is
172
perceived to be.
Even “brief exposure” to case-specific information can entrench
beliefs about guilt by generating an enduring lens through which jurors
173
filter the evidence at trial. It is more than “the difficulty of effacing
prejudicial publicity from the minds of the jurors,” however, that
explains why “trial courts must take strong measures to ensure that the
174
balance is never weighed against the accused.” Case-specific beliefs
should disqualify jurors not because they persuade but because they
distort consideration of admissible evidence by masquerading as the kind
of information about the facts and events that is subject to crossexamination.
b. Pervasive
Sometimes media reports or social conversation about a case
permeates the affected geographic region across the board. A party may
in such cases ask the court to move the area from which potential jurors
are drawn or delay the trial to let memories of that exposure fade and
175
attending passions subside. In high-profile cases that generate pretrial
publicity—what Justice Kennedy called “atmospheric”—the Supreme
176
Court has focused on these same two elements of case-specific beliefs.
First is its content. The Court has emphasized the reliable appearance
and inflammatory nature of a defendant’s televised murder confession,
for example, as a reason to reverse his conviction when his request for a
177
change in venue was denied.
What sets pervasive, case-specific beliefs apart from narrow beliefs
is the breadth of exposure to those beliefs within a particular geographic
area. With respect to this second dimension of pretrial publicity, courts

170. See Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2915−17 (2010).
171. See United States v. Church, 217 F. Supp. 2d 696, 698 (W.D. Va. 2002).
172. See, e.g., United States v. Bakker, 925 F.2d 728, 732−33 (4th Cir. 1991).
173. See Dan Simon, In Doubt: The Psychology of the Criminal Justice Process 186 (2012)
(explaining the “lingering impact” of discredited pretrial information on jurors’ beliefs about the case
in terms of so-called hindsight bias, belief preservation, and coherence effects).
174. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362 (1966).
175. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 725 (1961).
176. Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 448 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
177. See Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 726−27 (1963).
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highlight its saturation, frequency, and availability. Sporadic media
exposure across a sprawling community is less problematic, on this
account, than intensive exposure of case-specific facts “delivered
regularly to approximately 95% of the dwellings” near which the
litigated events took place, while “radio and TV stations . . . likewise
blanketed” that same concentrated region from which the jury pool was
179
selected. The presence of these kinds of outside influences threatens an
indispensable balance of objectivity among jurors.
***
Personal interests and case-specific beliefs so impair the objective
ideal of the jury that deference to trial courts is misplaced in
determinations about whether potential jurors affected by these sources
180
of outside influence can serve impartially. That the impartiality inquiry
is “not easily subject to appellate review” cannot reduce to empty
rhetoric or rudderless confusion the constitutional imperative to curb the
distorted impact of personal interests or case-specific beliefs on jury
181
decisionmaking.
There are two measures that trial courts should take to efface from
the jury sufficiently strong personal interests and case-specific beliefs.
First, courts could lower the standard for presuming a disqualifying bias,
182
subject to rebuttal that a juror is impartial. Second, courts could
require individualized questionnaires designed specifically to ascertain
these pernicious sources of outside influence.
Exclusion should be more readily assumed for jurors who hold
strong personal interests or case-specific beliefs. Individuals with strong
connections or exposure to inadmissible information should be
183
presumptively disqualified. The Supreme Court should use common
law or a revision of the federal rules of procedure to lower the threshold
for presumptive disqualification for personal interests and case-specific
beliefs to the less demanding reasonable-likelihood-of-unfairness
184
standard that it adopted only briefly in Sheppard v. Maxwell.

178. See Irvin, 366 U.S. at 725–27.
179. Id. at 725.
180. See, e.g., Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2923 (2010) (explaining that “the deference
due to district courts is at its pinnacle” in determinations about jury impartiality).
181. Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 188 (1981).
182. See United States v. Torres, 128 F.3d 38, 43–47 (2d Cir. 1997) (distinguishing bias that is
admitted from that which is presumed from statutory criteria and bias that is inferred “when a juror
discloses a fact that bespeaks a risk of partiality sufficiently significant to warrant granting the trial
judge discretion to excuse the juror for cause, but not so great as to make mandatory a presumption of
bias”); see also United States v. Thomas, 627 F.3d 146, 161 (5th Cir. 2010) (similar).
183. See Coughlin v. Tailhook Ass’n, 112 F.3d 1052, 1062 (9th Cir. 1997).
184. 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966); 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2014) (establishing a congressional approval
requirement).
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That this disqualification is presumptive and not absolute provides
the opportunity for clarifying questioning in borderline cases in which
personal interests or case-specific beliefs are arguably remote or
attenuated under the particular circumstances. Follow-up voir dire in such
limited cases should be individualized, sequestered, and open-ended if it
is to realize its promise as an “effective method of rooting out” these
185
objectionable categories of bias.
Mandatory questionnaires should ask prospective jurors to disclose
any pretrial acquaintance with the facts and any social or economic
connections to the case. Such questionnaires would be time- and costeffective, easy to administer, and “superior to voir dire in obtaining [true
186
and complete] answers to questions.” Live questioning that takes place
in full view of judges, lawyers, and other prospective jurors might make
people reticent to reveal personal interests or case-specific beliefs in a
way that insulated surveys would not.
These sources of mental influence are less susceptible to the
vagaries of self-reported bias that plague voir dire more broadly. That is
because people are usually aware of whether they have heard about
events in the case, have a financial holding in its outcome, or a social
relationship to the people involved. Nor are these the sensitive kinds of
outside influence about social groups or ideologies that more often give
jurors reason to conceal their views. Disclosure about which news
sources a prospective juror uses or how she invests her money does not
tend to be personal or embarrassing in the way that attitudes about race
or politics might.
As the Court insists, a potential juror’s cursory affirmation that she
187
is impartial should not suffice to establish her qualification to serve. It
is a mistake to decline to find reversible error when a trial judge declines,
for example, to excuse from jury service a patient of the doctor who is
188
sued for medical malpractice, an agent of a firm that insures personal
189
injury defendants, a member of the same church as the mother of the
190
decedent in a murder trial, or the employee of one local oil company in
191
an action against its competitor.
The judge’s appraisal in these cases of a “prospective juror’s
inflection, sincerity, demeanor, candor, body language, and apprehension
192
of duty” is little solace.
Courts cannot trust a juror’s claim to

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1038 n.13 (1984) (citation omitted).
Joseph A. Colquitt, Using Jury Questionnaires; (Ab)using Jurors, 40 Conn. L. Rev. 1, 15–16 (2007).
Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 439–41 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Poynter v. Ratcliff, 874 F.2d 219, 221–22 (4th Cir. 1989).
Lusich v. Bloomfield S.S. Co., 355 F.2d 770, 775 (5th Cir. 1966).
Porter v. Illinois, 479 U.S. 898, 899 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Marks v. Shell Oil Co., 895 F.2d 1128, 1130–31 (6th Cir. 1990).
Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2918 (2010).
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impartiality if she “admits exposure to pretrial publicity” or connection
to a party without at least asking “what he has read or heard about the
case” or how close that connection is in order to determine “what
193
corresponding impressions he has formed.” The presence of personal
interests or case-specific beliefs make it “likely that at least some of the
seated jurors, despite stating that they could be fair, harbor[] similar
194
biases that a more probing inquiry would likely have exposed.”
B. Vindicating the Subjective Ideal
Potential jurors are moved by more than protecting their families
and wallets, and they harbor opinions about more than the events and
people at trial. What I call community interests comprise the social goods
and ills that a juror attributes to the broader community. Jurors can
identify with the community or feel pressure to conform to its norms in
ways that favor a particular side. These stakes may be clear to residents
of that community, whether or not news media or social rumor convey
case-specific information about the people and events. That such interests
span a community’s “yearning to see justice done” and its “urge for
retribution” after a conspicuous crime or scandal makes clear that it is as
195
important to preserve some of these on the jury as it is to efface others.
The moral complexity of such solidarities among jurors is also
reflected in case-general beliefs about ideologies or affiliations. Ideological
kinds of case-general beliefs range from mercy for a defendant subject to
prosecutorial misconduct to spite for the one whose minor offense would
qualify as the third strike under a recidivist statute. Neither ideological nor
affiliative case-general beliefs are good or bad across the board, and are
categorically worth preserving or uprooting. Compare racial stereotyping
with understanding based on shared experiences. Bigotry infects the jury
196
no less than empathy informs it. These are two categories of bias whose
careful accommodation among jurors serves to vindicate the subjective
ideal of the jury.
These categories of bias are importantly distinct from those
analyzed in the previous Subpart. Every personal interest or case-specific
belief, at least when it is strong enough, corrodes the measure of
objectivity that we demand from jurors, without loss to the kind of
subjectivity that we at the same time expect. By contrast, community
interests and case-general beliefs admit of certain influences that
preserve the subjective element that jurors should bring to trial. That is,
some community interests and case-general beliefs make up the sort of

193.
194.
195.
196.

Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 441–43 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2962 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 571 (1980).
See supra notes 136–141 and accompanying text.
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common sense and life experience that our juries should not eschew, but
prize. These classes of bias call for a more sophisticated approach—
beyond detecting and striking jurors who harbor them—that channels
biases in constructive ways.
1. Community Interests
Community interests are like personal interests but instead of
capturing the narrow regard for one’s self, family, and friends, they
reflect a broader concern for one’s locality. Just as in a case that presents
social or financial stakes, a person is likely to decide it in a way that
serves those interests, so too may a case that holds implications for his
community lead him to an outcome that serves its security, economy, or
197
customs. But we do not condemn every such community interest as we
do all personal interests among jurors.
198
Some “community concern[s]” that vary across regions reflect the
law’s resolve to provide a “jury . . . of the peers” from among “neighbors,
199
fellows, [and] associates.”
Those local values that reflect base
retribution or bare parochialism erode the jury’s requisite objectivity.
But we tolerate or even prize others, not just to “[]guard against the
corrupt or overzealous prosecutor[,]” but also to vindicate a community’s
shared (and unobjectionable) beliefs about race, faith, family, or justice
200
that find expression in a certain time and place.
Consider the community interest of Paul Butler’s proposal that
juries enforce drug laws only very weakly, if at all, as a reaction to the
201
mass incarceration of young black men within a particular area. Or
consider a community interest to harshly punish pornography based on
202
regional norms of sexual morality. The subjective ideal suggests that
these community interests deserve to be heard by a jury of peers. The
text of the Sixth Amendment reflects this incorporation of community
interests in jury decisionmaking when it follows the impartiality clause
with the requirement that prospective jurors be selected from “the State
203
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.”

197. See Keise Izuma et al., Processing of the Incentive for Social Approval in the Ventral Striatum
During Charitable Donation, 22 J. Cognitive Neurosci. 621, 628–29 (2010).
198. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 570–71.
199. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880); see Oldham, supra note 58, at 176
(contrasting peer with expert juries that include citizens with special knowledge or qualifications).
200. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
201. See Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System,
105 Yale L.J. 677, 679 (1995). I propose measures to reduce the incidence of and pressures associated
with jury nullification. See infra notes 247–248 and accompanying text.
202. See Robert F. Nagel, Unfocused Governmental Interests, 55 Alb. L. Rev. 573, 576–77 (1992)
(discussing Justice Brennan’s dissent in Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973)).
203. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
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a. Identifying
Community interests arise when jurors identify with that community
or feel pressure to conform to its perceived norms or welfare. The extent
to which such identifying interests tend to influence a prospective juror
depends on the strength of her group identification and relevance of that
204
community interest to the issues presented at trial. These interests can
arise independent of any case-specific exposure because a juror may
identify with the community even if the “facts of the case were ‘neither
heinous nor sensational’” and “media coverage ‘ha[d] . . . been objective
205
and unemotional.’”
Consider the community interest at stake in a criminal trial in Miami
206
that had provoked pretrial race riots. The case involved a Hispanic
officer who was tried for the deaths of two African-American
207
motorcyclists. An appeals court overturned the jury’s manslaughter
conviction on the ground that the trial judge should have granted a
change of venue to seek jurors who were not influenced by extra208
evidentiary considerations. Miami jurors were inclined to convict, the
court explained, for fear that acquittal would have reignited violence in
209
the city with which they identified.
Consider also the identifying kind of community interests that
plausibly affected the jurors who convicted the former CEO of Enron,
the Houston-based energy and commodities corporation, for federal
fraud and insider trading related to the company’s financial downfall.
That Houston residents so strongly identified with Enron helps to
explain why “animosity toward Jeffrey Skilling ran deep,” as Justice
Sotomayor wrote in dissent, “and the desire for conviction was widely
210
shared.”
[M]ost Houstonians identified Enron with their city—the place of its
founding and headquarters. Enron provided a source of pride for
Houstonians, as well as a stimulus to the local economy. When the
company descended into bankruptcy, thousands lost their jobs and
savings, and local businesses and communities lost important monetary
211
contributions.

204. See Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, Incentives and Prosocial Behavior, 96 Am. Econ. Rev.
1652, 1653 (2006).
205. Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2901, 2908 (2010) (citations omitted).
206. See Tony Pugh, A Taut Tallahassee Waits as Lozano Trial Approaches, Miami Herald,
Mar. 1, 1993, at lA.
207. See id.; see also Lozano v. State, 584 So. 2d 19, 21 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
208. See Lozano, 584 So. 2d at 22 n.5. The officer was acquitted on remand in Orlando. See Larry
Rohters, Tension Surrenders to Relief as Miami Reacts to Verdict, N.Y. Times, May 30, 1993, at A18.
209. See Lozano, 584 So. 2d at 22–23.
210. See Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
211. Christina Collins, Note, Stuck in the 1960s: Supreme Court Misses an Opportunity in Skilling v.
United States to Bring Venue Jurisprudence into the Twenty-First Century, 44 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 391,
415 (2012) (footnotes omitted).
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It is not just that “four [of the jurors who decided the case] knew
212
former Enron employees who lost [their] savings.” It is that those
individuals who identify with Houston and the corporation once at the
heart of it might quite reasonably seek to vindicate their disrupted sense
of city “pride” in a manner that inclines them to return a verdict “against
213
those who oversaw Enron’s collapse.” That community interest should
be tolerated as a relevant subjective perspective, so long as it does not
ride roughshod over the competing ideal of jury objectivity.
b. Conforming
A prospective juror need not himself identify with a broader group
for its values or goals to exert “outside influence” over his thinking about
a case. A related interest arises when a juror who does not herself
identify with the community nevertheless feels pressure to conform her
decisionmaking in a way that would serve that community’s perceived
interests. The Enron case is again instructive. Justice Sotomayor
described such conforming interests in her dissent: “Juror 75, for
instance, told the court, ‘I think a lot of people feel that they’re guilty.
And maybe they’re expecting something to come out of this trial.’ It
would be ‘tough,’ she recognized ‘to vote not guilty and go back into the
214
community.’” The trial court in Skilling acknowledged this need to
withstand community pressure upon return when it announced to potential
215
jurors during voir dire that “it would take courage” for them to acquit.
Another example comes from the trial of Timothy McVeigh for the
Oklahoma City bombing that affected thousands of victims’ family and
216
friends across the state. The judge in the case was right to have ordered
a change of venue, explaining that “[t]he effects of the explosion on that
community are so profound and pervasive” that jurors who come from
the community, whether or not they themselves shared the city’s values,
could be expected to feel “a sense of obligation to reach a result which
217
will find general acceptance in the relevant audience.” These interests
cave to, rather than identify with, concern for the welfare of one’s
218
community.

212. Brief for Petitioner at 13, Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010) (No. 08-1394), 2009
WL 4818500, at *19.
213. United States v. Skilling, 554 F.3d 529, 561 (5th Cir. 2009), aff’d in part, 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010).
214. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations
omitted).
215. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 212, at 9.
216. United States v. McVeigh, 918 F. Supp. 1467 (W.D. Okla. 1996).
217. Id. at 1470, 1473.
218. For more on brain correlates of conformity, see Vasily Klucharev et al., Downregulation of
the Posterior Medial Frontal Cortex Prevents Social Conformity, 31 J. Neurosci. 11, 934 (2011).
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2. Case-General Beliefs
A second category of outside influences is, like community interests,
a mixed bag, ranging from worthy perspectives to hateful intolerance.
This last class of extra-trial factors that get lumped under the term bias
comprises attitudes about the broader kinds of social groups or social
ideologies relevant to the litigation but independent of the specific
219
people or events at trial.
These case-general beliefs concern views about a social group to
which a party or witness belongs, and ideological views about the crime,
defense, or punishment. Cases before the Supreme Court have considered
jurors’ beliefs about whether the act that a defendant is said to have
220
committed should be criminalized, about whether a punishment such as
221
the death penalty should (ever) be imposed, and about a defendant’s
222
race, especially if the victim belongs to a different race.
These case-general beliefs often relate to a case-salient cause or
group with which a juror identifies, apart from her community writ large.
Dan Kahan and his colleagues have demonstrated that people “tend
selectively to credit empirical information in patterns congenial to their
cultural values” under conditions like those at trial in which people must
make sense of uncertain or ambiguous facts among competing claims
223
about how they matter.
a. Affiliative
The first kind of case-general beliefs concerns the social groups to
which jurors belong or that the trial is perceived to implicate. Jurors
bring to the court a range of life experiences and attitudes that relate to
their being young or old, religious or atheist, “a man or woman, a black
person or a white person, a low-wage laborer as distinct from a well-paid

219. See Note, Community Hostility and the Right to an Impartial Jury, 60 Colum. L. Rev. 349, 350
(1960) (distinguishing “general knowledge and predisposition” from extraevidentiary beliefs that
“operate solely in a particular case or with respect to a particular defendant”).
220. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 157 (1878) (holding that potential jurors living in
polygamy were not impartial to serve in the trial of a defendant accused of bigamy).
221. See Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 423 (1985) (spelling out conditions under which states
may exclude prospective jurors in capital cases for their opposition to the death penalty).
222. See Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 33 (1986) (reversing death sentence of black defendant
convicted of murdering white man because trial judge failed to ask about possible racial bias).
223. Dan M. Kahan et al., “They Saw a Protest”: Cognitive Illiberalism and the Speech-Conduct
Distinction, 64 Stan. L. Rev. 851, 859 (2012); see Dan M. Kahan, Foreword: Neutral Principles,
Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 24 (2011)
(citations omitted) (“[M]ock jury studies have linked identity-protective cognition . . . to conflicting
perceptions of the risk posed by a motorist fleeing the police in a high-speed chase; of the consent of a
date rape victim who said ‘no’ but did not physically resist her assailant; of the volition of battered
women who kill in self-defense; and of the use of intimidation by political protestors.”).
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224

desk worker.” Jurors might share such affiliations with parties, victims,
attorneys, or witnesses in the case. These affiliations can in turn trigger
assumptions that people from certain groups are more or less credible or
dangerous, worthy of pity, or likely to reoffend.
The normative valence of these affiliative case-general beliefs range
225
from the laudable to the repugnant. Juror attitudes that stigmatize or
degrade other groups, for example, are worth avoiding more than
statistical stereotypes or cultural norms. Differently situated people often
perceive the same event in a very different light, depending on how they
view social disadvantage or how they identify with the life experiences of
226
others.
The fact that a young black defendant from a poor neighborhood
fled from the police, for instance, might be construed by a juror who
grew up under similar conditions as evidence that the defendant feared
mistreatment by police, but regarded by a juror from an affluent social
background as evidence of the defendant’s guilt. Neither perspective
should be excluded from deliberations simply because it reflects an
outside source of juror influence. But certainly racial bigotry should.
Affiliative beliefs are about more than race. They might also concern
gender, national origin, and sexual orientation, or any number of socially
salient occupations or roles—such as spouses, mechanics, and social
activists—as well as traits and behaviors—such as old, loyal, and violent.
Justice O’Connor has written, for example, that “the battered wife [] on
trial for wounding her abusive husband” might reasonably seek “to
ensure that the jury of her peers contains as many women members as
227
possible.”
Consider also affiliative beliefs that relate to a juror’s felony
conviction:
[A] person who has suffered the most severe form of condemnation
that can be inflicted by the state . . . might . . . harbor a continuing
resentment against ‘the system’ that punished him and [a uniquely

224. Taylor v. Sisto, 606 F.3d 622, 627–28 (9th Cir. 2010), superseded by 449 F. App’x 665 (9th Cir.
2011) (linking “[t]he requirement of representativeness . . . to the varied and unique experiences that
Americans of different backgrounds bring into the jury box”).
225. See supra notes 66–70 and accompanying text.
226. See, e.g., Dov Fox, Silver Spoons and Golden Genes: Genetic Engineering and the Egalitarian
Ethos, 33 Am. J.L. & Med. 567, 592, 592 n.154 (2007); see id. at 593 n.159 (explaining why, for example,
“white males [might] struggle empathizing with the obstacles that females and minorities face in a
social system characterized by patriarchy and racial prejudice”).
227. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 149, 151 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(explaining that “one need not be a sexist to share the intuition that in certain cases a person’s gender
and resulting life experience will be relevant to his or her view of the case”); see also Abbott Labs.
Supplemental Brief Regarding United States v. Windsor, Smithkline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs.,
740 F.3d 471 (9th Cir. 2014) (Nos. 11-17357, 11-17373), 2014 WL 211807 (concerning whether
prospective jurors can be excluded from service on the basis of their sexual orientation).
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informed perspective, even if typically in] favor of the defendant on
228
trial, who is seen as a fellow underdog caught in its toils.

The same twin charge of hostility or empathy might be levied against a
juror who himself or whose loved one has fallen victim to a tort or crime
229
that resembles the events or crimes at issue in the trial.
The powerful influence of these affiliations coheres with the “story
model” of jurors who reconstruct legal facts as a narrative whose themes
230
depend on the understandings that they draw from their own lives. This
mixed bag of affiliative case-general beliefs demands a more tailored
response than uprooting such bias across the board. I will explain this
approach after clarifying ideological case-general beliefs below.
b. Ideological
Among the ideological kind of case-general beliefs are moral,
political, or religious commitments that relate to those presented at trial.
Consider jurors who hold strong opinions about, for instance, obscenity
in a child pornography case, tort reform in a class action suit, or
environmentalism in a pollution case. Commentators in the George
Zimmerman trial have similarly seen the case as a referendum for issues
ranging from self-defense and gun ownership to racial profiling and civil
231
rights. The juror who feels passionately about a particular cause in a
case that she perceives as implicating it may find it difficult to be
dispassionate about the outcome in the way that the objective ideal of
the jury requires. Scientists have shown that abstract belief systems
correspond to psychological differences explained in part by the human
232
needs for security and solidarity.
Not all ideological case-general beliefs are objectionable. They
“serve[] causes both good and ill,” the Ninth Circuit recognized in a
233
different context. We applaud the case-general beliefs that jurors held
against “the morally-obnoxious fugitive slave laws,” for example, as we
do those jurors who refused to indict “John Peter Zenger, a newspaper
publisher charged with libel after criticizing the Governor of New

228. Rubio v. Superior Court, 593 P.2d 595, 600 (Cal. 1979).
229. See Brian C. Kalt, The Exclusion of Felons from Jury Service, 53 Am. U. L. Rev. 65, 127 (2003).
230. See, e.g., Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making:
The Story Model, 13 Cardozo L. Rev. 519, 519–20 (1991).
231. See, e.g., Adam Weinstein, The Trayvon Martin Killing, Explained, Mother Jones (Mar. 18,
2012, 9:42 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/03/what-happened-trayvon-martin-explained.
232. See, e.g., Drew Westen, The Political Brain: The Role of Emotion in Deciding the Fate
of the Nation (2007); John T. Jost et al., Political Ideology: Its Structure, Functions, and Elective
Affinities, 60 Ann. Rev. Psychol. 307, 337 (2009).
233. United States v. Navarro-Vargas, 408 F.3d 1184, 1199 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (holding that
grand jury independence has historically served causes both good and ill).
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York . . . because the jurors were politically opposed to the
234
prosecutions.”
A more contentious case concerns juror views about the death
penalty. Some jurors have conscientious scruples against capital
punishment broadly or believe that defendants from disadvantaged groups
in particular deserve mercy because the criminal justice system tends to
235
treat them worse. Other jurors strongly favor the death penalty as a
symbol of opposition to social deviance or commitment to individual
236
responsibility. The Supreme Court has held that “those who firmly
believe that the death penalty is unjust may nevertheless serve as jurors
in capital cases so long as they . . . are willing to temporarily set aside
their own beliefs in deference to” the state’s interest in carrying out its
237
capital punishment laws.
This standard permits a trial judge to excuse for cause the potential
juror who would not, during the sentencing phase, be able to impose a
238
sentence of death, however heinous and unmitigated the crime. But the
Supreme Court erred in authorizing the dismissal of a juror for her
widely held scruples—because she would reserve the punishment of
execution for very grave cases—where she nonetheless affirmed her
ability and willingness to consider mitigating and aggravating factors as
239
required under the state laws.
***
That only a subset of case-general beliefs and community interests
warrant exclusion from the jury makes these across-the-board categories,
as with personal interests and case-specific beliefs, an unfitting basis for
presumptive, indiscriminate disqualification. For personal interests and

234. Id. at 1192, 1199; see Vidmar & Hans, supra note 47, at 225 (“If Northern juries of the 1850s
acquitted the courageous people who harbored slaves in defiance of the Fugitive Slave Act, Southern
juries a hundred years later acquitted people who had beaten and killed the descendants of those
slaves as they attempted to assert their legal rights.”).
235. See Uttecht v. Brown, 551 U.S. 1, 35 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“A cross section of
virtually every community in the country includes citizens who firmly believe the death penalty is
unjust but who nevertheless are qualified to serve as jurors in capital cases.”).
236. Dan M. Kahan and colleagues contrast anti-death penalty “egalitarian/solidarists” with prodeath penalty “hierarchist/individualists.” Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence,
113 Harv. L. Rev. 413, 439–42 (1999); John Gastil et al., The ‘Wildavsky Heuristic’: The Cultural
Orientation of Mass Political Opinion 19–21 (Oct. 15, 2005) (unpublished article), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=834264.
237. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 176 (1986).
238. See generally Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985) (expounding on the proper standard for
determining when prospective jurors may be excluded based on capital punishment views).
239. Uttecht, 551 U.S. at 44 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The juror gave as an example of the kind of
case in which he might vote for death one in which the defendant would reoffend if released from
prison. When the attorneys clarified that under the state death penalty statute, the jury could sentence
a capital defendant only to death or life without parole—thus preventing any chance of the
defendant’s release—the juror confirmed that he would consider and impose the death penalty in the
appropriate circumstance. Id. at 36–37 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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case-specific beliefs, courts need only assess their presence and
magnitude. I propose questionnaires that ask potential jurors about their
knowledge of the people and events at trial and their social or financial
stakes in the case. The uniform threat that these sources of influence
pose to jury impartiality warrants a low threshold for presumptive
240
exclusion. I would indeed limit voir dire to those instances in which it is
useful to clarify ambiguous written responses about personal interests or
case-specific beliefs.
For community interests and case-general beliefs, by contrast, some
subvert the tension between an objective and subjective ideal of the jury,
while others enrich that balance. I propose accommodating their
influence by forgoing voir dire and declining to question prospective
jurors about community interests and case-general beliefs. This will
permit valued outside influences among these to assume their rightful
place on the jury, yet will also let in those among them that are
pernicious. I am not sanguine about the pervasive evil of biases like
racial bigotry. To rein these darker manifestations of community
interests and case-general beliefs, trial courts should supplement their
broad acceptance with deeper jury pool diversity before voir dire and
241
pretrial judicial instructions that encourage perspective sharing.
Community interests and case-general beliefs on the jury are
managed better on the other side of the Atlantic. In England, potential
jurors are not dismissed for these or other unspecified reasons, as the
242
practice of peremptory challenges permits in the United States.
Limiting juror exclusions to personal interests and case-specific beliefs is
the first step in achieving balance between subjective and objective
elements of the impartial jury.
Declining to ask potential jurors about community interests and
case-general beliefs is not a panacea. But it is better than our heavy
reliance on peremptories. Eligible jurors who are “selected at random,”
and thereby received “as they come,” Lord Denning explained over
thirty years ago, tend to “represent the views of the common man” and
“the people as a whole” better than jurors who survive objection by the
parties after being “cross-examine[d]” for “their views on this matter or
that which may arise in the course of the hearing—so as to see if they are
243
prejudiced in any way.”

240. See supra notes 193–185 and accompanying text.
241. That my proposed means of empanelling juries are quicker and cheaper than voir dire may, as
a welcome byproduct, make it more likely that disputes will be resolved through trial rather than
either plea bargaining in the criminal context, coercive as it tends to be, or civil settlements based on
deficient discovery. See John H. Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil Trial in the United States,
122 Yale L.J. 522, 561–64 (2012) (discussing the costs and benefits of civil and criminal trials).
242. See, e.g., Pullar v. H.M. Advocate, (1993) J.C. 126, 134–35 (Scot.).
243. Regina v. Sheffield Crown Ct, ex parte Brownlow, [1980] Q.B. 530 (C.A.) 541–42.
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A more inclusionary approach to community interests and casegeneral beliefs that prevents either side from seeking to bend the
composition of the jury in its favor would allay suspicions that
prospective jurors are removed for reasons that are capricious,
244
speculative, cynical, or sinister. The abolition of peremptories would
also save time, judicial resources, and privacy risks, while reducing the
reliance on jury consultants—a low-tech neuro-voir dire available only to
245
the affluent—that exacerbates inequalities between the parties.
Allowing anyone who harbors such biases to serve, however, poses a
real danger that more juries will hang, reach unjust verdicts, or refuse to
follow the law. That is because ignorance about jurors’ community
interests and case-general beliefs, without more, jeopardizes the jury’s
essential objective dimension by making it more likely that people with
harmful such biases are allowed to sit. It will not do to abide by Lord
Denning’s assurance that “the chances are 1,000 to one against any juror
246
[who emerges randomly] being found unsuitable.” There is a real
threat that drawing community interests and case-general beliefs into the
jury room could unwittingly slant the attitudes with which jurors arrive to
trial, frustrate their openness to persuasion in the course of deliberations,
247
or subvert the prospect of agreement upon a verdict.
To mitigate these risks, I propose supplementing narrow biasspecific questionnaires with two reforms designed to discipline
overpowering and otherwise objectionable case-general beliefs and
community interests within the dynamics of group decisionmaking. The
first—deepening diversification of the jury pool—would take place
before jurors are selected; the second—identity-affirming instructions—
248
would take place after.
First, I would diversify jury pool by adding to the source list those
who pay income tax, who receive public assistance, or who have recently
moved or become citizens. The Supreme Court has squarely rejected the
view that “a constitutionally impartial jury can be constructed . . . by
249
‘balancing’ the various predispositions of the individual jurors.” Yet
the taming of good and bad biases may require less.
Take affiliative case-general biases about race in the Zimmerman
trial, in which a jury with no black members determined that the shooting
244. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
245. See Hoffman, supra note 83, at 29.
246. Regina v. Sheffield Crown Ct, ex parte Brownlow, [1980] Q.B. 530 (C.A.) 542.
247. Dov Fox, Retracing Liberalism and Remaking Nature: Designer Children, Research Embryos,
and Featherless Chickens, 24 Bioethics 170, 173 (2010).
248. The implementation of any such debiasing mechanisms should of course be sensitive to the
risks of under- or over-correction. See Timothy D. Wilson et al., Mental Contamination and the
Debiasing Problem, in Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment 185, 191
(Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002).
249. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 177–78 (1986); see also supra notes 57–61.
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death of a young black man in Florida did not constitute a crime. A month
after Martin was killed, economists published a study of conviction rates
in 700 Florida felony trials from 2000 to 2010 based on the composition
of potential jurors called to the courthouse, controlling for racial
250
composition of jurors ultimately selected to serve. Their findings are
shocking.
When the pool of eligible jurors drawn from a community included
no black members, black defendants were convicted at a rate almost
251
twenty percent higher than white defendants. But when there was even
a single black person in the jury pool, the conviction rate was lower for
252
black defendants than for whites. So conviction rates for blacks and
whites nearly flipped based on whether just one black person was
253
randomly assigned to the jury pool. This stunning finding controlled for
a wide range of variables including the race, gender, and age of seated
254
jurors and the offense class and history of the defendant.
Why might racial diversity in the pool from which jurors are chosen
be thought to influence jury verdicts or even curb prejudice or promote
empathy? Two kinds of explanations emerge from the neuroscience of
bias control, each corresponding to the internal as opposed to external
255
reasons to control bias. The first explanation is that jurors’ engagement
alongside people of different races as they wait in the courthouse before
trial might enlarge perspectives and shape perceptions in constructive
256
ways, even if the jury itself is not diverse. By confronting eventual
jurors with the live possibility of serving with people from other races,
this background condition of pretrial diversity has the power to activate
internal commitments to cross-racial understanding or attenuate the
257
expression of pejorative stereotypes during trial.
The second reason is that jury pool diversity promises to subdue the
risks of admitting certain biases concerns “external” juror motivation to
258
avoid disapproval. Jurors’ awareness that they might need to reach a
shared verdict with those who are different, other studies suggest, leads
250. See Shamena Anwar et al., The Impact of Jury Race in Criminal Trials, 127 Q. J. Eco. 1017,
1017–19 (2012).
251. Id. at 1034–35.
252. Id. at 1035.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 1032–34.
255. See supra notes 95–102 and accompanying text.
256. See Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity and Group Decision Making: Identifying Multiple
Effects of Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations, 90 J. Person. & Soc. Psychol. 597, 607–08 (2006).
257. See id. at 602. Cf. Kang et al., supra note 74, at 1172 (arguing that “reminding [jurors] of
countertypical associations . . . might momentarily activate different mental patterns while in the
courthouse and reduce the impact of implicit biases on their decisionmaking”).
258. Studies show that white jurors who serve on racially mixed juries—as opposed to all-white
ones—are less likely, by a considerable measure, to think that a black defendant is guilty, not just after
they deliberate, but even before trial. See Sommers, supra note 256, at 604–05.
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them to lay greater emphasis on actual and missing evidence in
deliberations, permit fewer inaccurate statements to go uncorrected, and
undertake richer dialogue on sensitive matters, without greater risk of
259
hung or nullifying juries. Researchers explain that diversity in the jury
pool prompts jurors, for fear of being perceived as prejudiced, to engage
more carefully with the evidence and more openly with ideals and
260
backgrounds other than their own.
The inclusion of other case-general beliefs and community interests
in the jury pool might in a similar way help to encourage perspective
sharing and critical appraisal of unreflective sources of outside influence.
The procedures that trial courts use to create jury pools today often
exclude, without meaning to, a disproportionate number of minorities and
others who tend to appear less on lists of voters or licensed drivers, who do
not remain at one address for long enough to receive a jury summons, or
261
cannot obtain transportation to the courthouse or time off from work.
But jurisdictions need not oversample from minority or otherwise
262
targeted neighborhoods to achieve the desired diversity in jury pool.
They could also expand the source list properties to include more
minorities and others who appear less frequently on lists of voters and
263
licensed drivers. Diversifying the jury pool using such non-salient
measures would enhance balanced deliberations without risking trading
on false or demeaning assumptions about jurors in the way that cross264
section jurisprudence forbids.
My second proposal advocates adoption of the judicial instructions
that judges and scholars have long derided but that debiasing research
has more recently commended as a promising way to enrich discourse

259. See id. at 609–10. Social psychologists have found that this prejudice-mitigating effect is even
stronger within decisionmaking contexts for which race is less salient, as when the victim and
defendant belong to different races, but race is not made a prominent issue at trial. See Samuel R.
Sommers, Race and the Decision Making of Juries, 12 Legal & Criminological Psychol. 171, 174
(2007); see also Cynthia Lee, Making Race Salient: Trayvon Martin and Implicit Bias in a Not Yet PostRacial Society, 91 N.C. L. Rev. 1555, 1589–90 (2013) (“The research on race salience suggests that it is
important to highlight the relevance of race and make jurors aware of the possibility of racial bias if
one is concerned that implicit racial bias might result in unfair treatment of either a Black defendant
or a Black victim.”).
260. See, e.g., Nilanjana Dasgupta & Luis M. Rivera, When Social Context Matters: The Influence of
Long-Term Contact and Short-Term Exposure to Admired Outgroup Members on Implicit Attitudes and
Behavioral Intentions, 26 Soc. Cognition 112, 115–16 (2008). See generally Tor D. Wager et al.,
Prefrontal-Subcortical Pathways Mediating Successful Emotion Regulation, 59 Neuron 1037 (2008)
(identifying prefrontal pathways that regulate emotion and using them to predict a reduction in emotion).
261. See, e.g., In re Jury Plan of E. Dist. of N.Y., 61 F.3d 119, 121–22 (2d Cir. 1995).
262. See generally United States v. Ovalle, 136 F.3d 1092 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding unconstitutional
racially salient efforts to achieve demographic balance within the jury pool).
263. See Nancy J. King, Racial Jurymandering: Cancer or Cure? A Contemporary Review of
Affirmative Action in Jury Selection, 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 707, 712–14 (1993).
264. See, e.g., Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 369 (1979).
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265

and reduce polarization. David Sklansky and others have suggested that
“the growing body of research on debiasing gives reason to think” that
such curative instructions “make it less likely that jurors will over-rely on”
or “react emotionally to” some factor whose undesirability a judge clearly
266
explains.
Consider case-general racial bigotry, whether it is deliberative or
automatic. Federal District Court Judge Mark Bennett, for example,
instructs jurors to avoid such biases that we all share in a non-accusatory
way that seeks to avoid putting jurors on the defensive or provoking their
267
resistance. The existing psychology research does not yet convince me
that judicial admonitions that jurors be aware of their own decisionmaking
268
processes or set aside certain sources of influence will be effective.
More encouraging is the prospect of using judicial instruction to
affirm a prospective juror’s sense of self-worth in ways that “suppl[y] a
buffer against the psychic cost associated with giving open-minded
269
evaluation to threatening information.” The expression of “moderation
or equivocation within groups” and of “openness or ambivalence by
those in the opposing group,” Dan M. Kahan and his colleagues suggest,
can relieve the dangers of community interests and case-general beliefs
by creating conditions under which jurors are more willing to entertain
270
diverging attitudes and “display cooperative open-mindedness.”
Kahan and colleagues derive from the psychological literature a
mechanism by which to stimulate such identity-affirmation on the jury.
Judges should instruct jurors, they propose, “to speak in turn and to
identify not only his or her own position but also the strongest
counterargument to it” to disrupt exaggerated assumptions of division
271
and afford jurors cover to reveal their ambivalence. Instructing jurors
before they are seated to deliberate in this give-and-take way will make
jurors less likely to act on the automatic biases that they do not on
reflection endorse but nonetheless hold. And it may even better the
chances that over the course of trial, they will “have given sympathetic
272
attention to evidence contrary to their cultural predispositions.”
265. See Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“The
naïve assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury is one that all
practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction.”); Peter J. Smith, New Legal Fictions, 95 Geo. L.J.
1435, 1451–52 (2007) (referring to the “presumption that jurors can understand and follow limiting
instructions” as a “legal fiction”).
266. Sklansky, supra note 9, at 416.
267. Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury Selection: The
Problems of Judge-Dominated Voire Dire, the Failed Promise of Batson, and Proposed Solutions,
4 Harv. L & Pol’y Rev. 149, 169 (2010).
268. See Sklansky, supra note 9, at 439.
269. Kahan et al., supra note 223, at 896.
270. Id. at 896–97 (emphasis omitted).
271. Id. at 897.
272. Id.
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Conclusion
Many critics of the Zimmerman verdict expressed their frustration
273
in terms of jury bias. This Article argues that this charge of bias is,
articulated at that level of abstraction, never enough to challenge a juror
or verdict.
The conception of jury bias that much of impartiality doctrine takes
for granted sweeps every source of outside influence under that vague
concept. No such monolithic conception of bias can meaningfully
distinguish those outside sources of juror influence that inform a fair trial
from those that infect it. There is instead, I have argued, a spectrum of
cognitive biases—personal interests, community interests, case-specific
beliefs, and case-general beliefs—whose constitutional statuses and
normative valences vary considerably.
I have recommended that courts vindicate the objective ideal of the
jury by purging only personal interests and case-specific beliefs and that
they vindicate the subjective ideal by adopting a more inclusive approach
with respect to community interests and case-general beliefs. The
practical effect of adopting these recommendations is to expand recusal
for cause, abolish peremptory challenges, and implement low-cost
debiasing measures that are informed by the most reliable available
evidence from social psychology and neuroscience.

273. See, e.g., Richard Gabriel, Race, Bias and the Zimmerman Jury, CNN Opinion (July 16, 2013,
4:14 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/16/opinion/gabriel-bias-zimmerman; Joe Patrice, The Rise and
Fall of Juror B37 and How Verdicts Are Made, Above the Law (July 16, 2013, 12:34 PM),
http://abovethelaw.com/2013/07/the-rise-and-fall-of-juror-b37-and-how-verdicts-are-made;
Rhonda
Waller, Juror Bias and the Trayvon Martin Case, Applied Soc. Psychol. (July 31, 2013, 3:48 PM),
http://www.personal.psu.edu/bfr3/blogs/asp/2013/07/juror-bias-and-the-trayvon-martin-case.html.

